Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Vagueness, Truth and Logic' and 'Introduction to the Philosophy of Mathematics'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

34 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
9766 Study vagueness first by its logic, then by its truth-conditions, and then its metaphysics [Fine,K]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
6782 Realism is the only philosophy of science that doesn't make the success of science a miracle [Putnam]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 2. Intuitionist Logic
17925 Showing a disproof is impossible is not a proof, so don't eliminate double negation [Colyvan]
17926 Rejecting double negation elimination undermines reductio proofs [Colyvan]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
9775 Excluded Middle, and classical logic, may fail for vague predicates [Fine,K]
17924 Excluded middle says P or not-P; bivalence says P is either true or false [Colyvan]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
9771 Logic holding between indefinite sentences is the core of all language [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
17929 Löwenheim proved his result for a first-order sentence, and Skolem generalised it [Colyvan]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
17930 Axioms are 'categorical' if all of their models are isomorphic [Colyvan]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
17928 Ordinal numbers represent order relations [Colyvan]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
17923 Intuitionists only accept a few safe infinities [Colyvan]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / j. Infinite divisibility
17941 Infinitesimals were sometimes zero, and sometimes close to zero [Colyvan]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
17922 Reducing real numbers to rationals suggested arithmetic as the foundation of maths [Colyvan]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / f. Mathematical induction
17936 Transfinite induction moves from all cases, up to the limit ordinal [Colyvan]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
17940 Most mathematical proofs are using set theory, but without saying so [Colyvan]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
17931 Structuralism say only 'up to isomorphism' matters because that is all there is to it [Colyvan]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
17932 If 'in re' structures relies on the world, does the world contain rich enough structures? [Colyvan]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
22181 Putnam says anti-realism is a bad explanation of accurate predictions [Putnam, by Okasha]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
9768 Vagueness is semantic, a deficiency of meaning [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / e. Higher-order vagueness
9776 A thing might be vaguely vague, giving us higher-order vagueness [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
9767 A vague sentence is only true for all ways of making it completely precise [Fine,K]
9770 Logical connectives cease to be truth-functional if vagueness is treated with three values [Fine,K]
9772 Meaning is both actual (determining instances) and potential (possibility of greater precision) [Fine,K]
9773 With the super-truth approach, the classical connectives continue to work [Fine,K]
9774 Borderline cases must be under our control, as capable of greater precision [Fine,K]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
9769 Vagueness can be in predicates, names or quantifiers [Fine,K]
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
17943 Probability supports Bayesianism better as degrees of belief than as ratios of frequencies [Colyvan]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
17939 Mathematics can reveal structural similarities in diverse systems [Colyvan]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / f. Necessity in explanations
17938 Mathematics can show why some surprising events have to occur [Colyvan]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / m. Explanation by proof
17934 Proof by cases (by 'exhaustion') is said to be unexplanatory [Colyvan]
17933 Reductio proofs do not seem to be very explanatory [Colyvan]
17935 If inductive proofs hold because of the structure of natural numbers, they may explain theorems [Colyvan]
17942 Can a proof that no one understands (of the four-colour theorem) really be a proof? [Colyvan]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
17937 Mathematical generalisation is by extending a system, or by abstracting away from it [Colyvan]