81 ideas
| 2352 | The job of the philosopher is to distinguish facts about the world from conventions [Putnam] |
| 14255 | We understand things through their dependency relations [Fine,K] |
| 14250 | Metaphysics deals with the existence of things and with the nature of things [Fine,K] |
| 16325 | Analysis rests on natural language, but its ideal is a framework which revises language [Halbach] |
| 16292 | An explicit definition enables the elimination of what is defined [Halbach] |
| 14259 | Maybe two objects might require simultaneous real definitions, as with two simultaneous terms [Fine,K] |
| 16307 | Don't trust analogies; they are no more than a guideline [Halbach] |
| 16330 | Truth-value 'gluts' allow two truth values together; 'gaps' give a partial conception of truth [Halbach] |
| 16339 | Truth axioms prove objects exist, so truth doesn't seem to be a logical notion [Halbach] |
| 16324 | Any definition of truth requires a metalanguage [Halbach] |
| 16293 | Traditional definitions of truth often make it more obscure, rather than less [Halbach] |
| 16301 | If people have big doubts about truth, a definition might give it more credibility [Halbach] |
| 16297 | Semantic theories avoid Tarski's Theorem by sticking to a sublanguage [Halbach] |
| 2345 | Semantic notions do not occur in Tarski's definitions, but assessing their correctness involves translation [Putnam] |
| 16337 | Disquotational truth theories are short of deductive power [Halbach] |
| 16322 | CT proves PA consistent, which PA can't do on its own, so CT is not conservative over PA [Halbach] |
| 16294 | Axiomatic truth doesn't presuppose a truth-definition, though it could admit it at a later stage [Halbach] |
| 16326 | The main semantic theories of truth are Kripke's theory, and revisions semantics [Halbach] |
| 16311 | To axiomatise Tarski's truth definition, we need a binary predicate for his 'satisfaction' [Halbach] |
| 16318 | Compositional Truth CT has the truth of a sentence depending of the semantic values of its constituents [Halbach] |
| 16299 | Gödel numbering means a theory of truth can use Peano Arithmetic as its base theory [Halbach] |
| 16340 | Truth axioms need a base theory, because that is where truth issues arise [Halbach] |
| 16305 | We know a complete axiomatisation of truth is not feasible [Halbach] |
| 16313 | A theory is 'conservative' if it adds no new theorems to its base theory [Halbach, by PG] |
| 16315 | The Tarski Biconditional theory TB is Peano Arithmetic, plus truth, plus all Tarski bi-conditionals [Halbach] |
| 16314 | Theories of truth are 'typed' (truth can't apply to sentences containing 'true'), or 'type-free' [Halbach] |
| 16327 | Friedman-Sheard is type-free Compositional Truth, with two inference rules for truth [Halbach] |
| 16332 | The KF theory is useful, but it is not a theory containing its own truth predicate [Halbach] |
| 16331 | The KF is much stronger deductively than FS, which relies on classical truth [Halbach] |
| 16329 | Kripke-Feferman theory KF axiomatises Kripke fixed-points, with Strong Kleene logic with gluts [Halbach] |
| 2347 | Asserting the truth of an indexical statement is not the same as uttering the statement [Putnam] |
| 16320 | Some say deflationism is axioms which are conservative over the base theory [Halbach] |
| 16338 | Deflationism says truth is a disquotation device to express generalisations, adding no new knowledge [Halbach] |
| 16317 | The main problem for deflationists is they can express generalisations, but not prove them [Halbach] |
| 16316 | Deflationists say truth is just for expressing infinite conjunctions or generalisations [Halbach] |
| 16319 | Compositional Truth CT proves generalisations, so is preferred in discussions of deflationism [Halbach] |
| 16335 | In Strong Kleene logic a disjunction just needs one disjunct to be true [Halbach] |
| 16334 | In Weak Kleene logic there are 'gaps', neither true nor false if one component lacks a truth value [Halbach] |
| 16309 | Every attempt at formal rigour uses some set theory [Halbach] |
| 16333 | The underestimated costs of giving up classical logic are found in mathematical reasoning [Halbach] |
| 16310 | A theory is some formulae and all of their consequences [Halbach] |
| 16342 | You cannot just say all of Peano arithmetic is true, as 'true' isn't part of the system [Halbach] |
| 16341 | Normally we only endorse a theory if we believe it to be sound [Halbach] |
| 16344 | Soundness must involve truth; the soundness of PA certainly needs it [Halbach] |
| 16347 | Many new paradoxes may await us when we study interactions between frameworks [Halbach] |
| 16336 | The liar paradox applies truth to a negated truth (but the conditional will serve equally) [Halbach] |
| 16321 | The compactness theorem can prove nonstandard models of PA [Halbach] |
| 16343 | The global reflection principle seems to express the soundness of Peano Arithmetic [Halbach] |
| 16312 | To reduce PA to ZF, we represent the non-negative integers with von Neumann ordinals [Halbach] |
| 16308 | Set theory was liberated early from types, and recent truth-theories are exploring type-free [Halbach] |
| 14253 | An object's 'being' isn't existence; there's more to an object than existence, and its nature doesn't include existence [Fine,K] |
| 16345 | That Peano arithmetic is interpretable in ZF set theory is taken by philosophers as a reduction [Halbach] |
| 14251 | A natural modal account of dependence says x depends on y if y must exist when x does [Fine,K] |
| 14257 | An object depends on another if the second cannot be eliminated from the first's definition [Fine,K] |
| 14261 | There is 'weak' dependence in one definition, and 'strong' dependence in all the definitions [Fine,K] |
| 14254 | Dependency is the real counterpart of one term defining another [Fine,K] |
| 2349 | Realists believe truth is correspondence, independent of humans, is bivalent, and is unique [Putnam] |
| 2351 | Aristotle says an object (e.g. a lamp) has identity if its parts stay together when it is moved [Putnam] |
| 14252 | We should understand identity in terms of the propositions it renders true [Fine,K] |
| 14256 | How do we distinguish basic from derived esssences? [Fine,K] |
| 14258 | Maybe some things have essential relationships as well as essential properties [Fine,K] |
| 14260 | An object only essentially has a property if that property follows from every definition of the object [Fine,K] |
| 16346 | Maybe necessity is a predicate, not the usual operator, to make it more like truth [Halbach] |
| 2331 | Functionalism says robots and people are the same at one level of abstraction [Putnam] |
| 2071 | If concepts have external meaning, computational states won't explain psychology [Putnam] |
| 2332 | Functionalism can't explain reference and truth, which are needed for logic [Putnam] |
| 2348 | Is there just one computational state for each specific belief? [Putnam] |
| 2344 | If we are going to eliminate folk psychology, we must also eliminate folk logic [Putnam] |
| 2074 | Can we give a scientific, computational account of folk psychology? [Putnam] |
| 2343 | Reference may be different while mental representation is the same [Putnam] |
| 2346 | Meaning and translation (which are needed to define truth) both presuppose the notion of reference [Putnam] |
| 2354 | "Meaning is use" is not a definition of meaning [Putnam] |
| 2336 | Holism seems to make fixed definition more or less impossible [Putnam] |
| 2334 | Meaning holism tried to show that you can't get fixed meanings built out of observation terms [Putnam] |
| 2335 | Understanding a sentence involves background knowledge and can't be done in isolation [Putnam] |
| 2340 | We should separate how the reference of 'gold' is fixed from its conceptual content [Putnam] |
| 2341 | Like names, natural kind terms have their meaning fixed by extension and reference [Putnam] |
| 2338 | Reference (say to 'elms') is a social phenomenon which we can leave to experts [Putnam] |
| 2339 | Aristotle implies that we have the complete concepts of a language in our heads, but we don't [Putnam] |
| 16298 | We need propositions to ascribe the same beliefs to people with different languages [Halbach] |
| 2342 | "Water" is a natural kind term, but "H2O" is a description [Putnam] |