30 ideas
8996 | If if time is money then if time is not money then time is money then if if if time is not money... [Quine] |
6782 | Realism is the only philosophy of science that doesn't make the success of science a miracle [Putnam] |
8995 | Definition by words is determinate but relative; fixing contexts could make it absolute [Quine] |
10064 | Quine quickly dismisses If-thenism [Quine, by Musgrave] |
20296 | Logic needs general conventions, but that needs logic to apply them to individual cases [Quine, by Rey] |
8998 | Claims that logic and mathematics are conventional are either empty, uninteresting, or false [Quine] |
8999 | Logic isn't conventional, because logic is needed to infer logic from conventions [Quine] |
9000 | If a convention cannot be communicated until after its adoption, what is its role? [Quine] |
15592 | The usual Tarskian interpretation of variables is to specify their range of values [Fine,K] |
15593 | Variables can be viewed as special terms - functions taking assignments into individuals [Fine,K] |
15590 | It seemed that Frege gave the syntax for variables, and Tarski the semantics, and that was that [Fine,K] |
15591 | In separate expressions variables seem identical in role, but in the same expression they aren't [Fine,K] |
15595 | The 'algebraic' account of variables reduces quantification to the algebra of its component parts [Fine,K] |
15594 | 'Instantial' accounts of variables say we grasp arbitrary instances from their use in quantification [Fine,K] |
15599 | Cicero/Cicero and Cicero/Tully may differ in relationship, despite being semantically the same [Fine,K] |
8994 | If analytic geometry identifies figures with arithmetical relations, logicism can include geometry [Quine] |
8997 | There are four different possible conventional accounts of geometry [Quine] |
8993 | If mathematics follows from definitions, then it is conventional, and part of logic [Quine] |
22181 | Putnam says anti-realism is a bad explanation of accurate predictions [Putnam, by Okasha] |
15603 | I can only represent individuals as the same if I do not already represent them as the same [Fine,K] |
15604 | If Cicero=Tully refers to the man twice, then surely Cicero=Cicero does as well? [Fine,K] |
15602 | Mental files are devices for keeping track of basic coordination of objects [Fine,K] |
15588 | You cannot determine the full content from a thought's intrinsic character, as relations are involved [Fine,K] |
15596 | The standard aim of semantics is to assign a semantic value to each expression [Fine,K] |
15587 | That two utterances say the same thing may not be intrinsic to them, but involve their relationships [Fine,K] |
15589 | The two main theories are Holism (which is inferential), and Representational (which is atomistic) [Fine,K] |
15598 | We should pursue semantic facts as stated by truths in theories (and not put the theories first!) [Fine,K] |
15600 | Referentialist semantics has objects for names, properties for predicates, and propositions for connectives [Fine,K] |
15601 | Fregeans approach the world through sense, Referentialists through reference [Fine,K] |
15605 | I take indexicals such as 'this' and 'that' to be linked to some associated demonstration [Fine,K] |