Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Mental Life of Some Machines', 'A Defense of Presentism' and 'Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed)'

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24 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
People who use science to make philosophical points don't realise how philosophical science is [Markosian]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 9. Making Past Truths
Presentism has the problem that if Socrates ceases to exist, so do propositions about him [Markosian]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Multiple realisability is said to make reduction impossible [Okasha]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Possible worlds must be abstract, because two qualitatively identical worlds are just one world [Markosian]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
Randomised Control Trials have a treatment and a control group, chosen at random [Okasha]
Not all sciences are experimental; astronomy relies on careful observation [Okasha]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
The discoverers of Neptune didn't change their theory because of an anomaly [Okasha]
Science mostly aims at confirming theories, rather than falsifying them [Okasha]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Theories with unobservables are underdetermined by the evidence [Okasha]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
Two things can't be incompatible if they are incommensurable [Okasha]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Induction is inferences from examined to unexamined instances of a given kind [Okasha]
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
If the rules only concern changes of belief, and not the starting point, absurd views can look ratiional [Okasha]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
Instances of pain are physical tokens, but the nature of pain is more abstract [Putnam, by Lycan]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
'Grabby' truth conditions first select their object, unlike 'searchy' truth conditions [Markosian]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / b. Laws of motion
Galileo refuted the Aristotelian theory that heavier objects fall faster [Okasha]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
Presentism is the view that only present objects exist [Markosian]
Presentism says if objects don't exist now, we can't have attitudes to them or relations with them [Markosian]
Presentism seems to entail that we cannot talk about other times [Markosian]
Serious Presentism says things must exist to have relations and properties; Unrestricted version denies this [Markosian]
Maybe Presentists can refer to the haecceity of a thing, after the thing itself disappears [Markosian]
Maybe Presentists can paraphrase singular propositions about the past [Markosian]
Special Relativity denies the absolute present which Presentism needs [Markosian]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / k. Temporal truths
Objects in the past, like Socrates, are more like imaginary objects than like remote spatial objects [Markosian]
People are mistaken when they think 'Socrates was a philosopher' says something [Markosian]