Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Meaning and the Moral Sciences', 'Category Mistakes' and 'The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757)'

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129 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
A culture needs to admit that knowledge is more extensive than just 'science' [Putnam]
'True' and 'refers' cannot be made scientically precise, but are fundamental to science [Putnam]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / a. Category mistakes
People have dreams which involve category mistakes [Magidor]
Category mistakes are either syntactic, semantic, or pragmatic [Magidor]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / b. Category mistake as syntactic
Category mistakes seem to be universal across languages [Magidor]
Category mistakes as syntactic needs a huge number of fine-grained rules [Magidor]
Embedded (in 'he said that…') category mistakes show syntax isn't the problem [Magidor]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / c. Category mistake as semantic
Category mistakes are meaningful, because metaphors are meaningful category mistakes [Magidor]
The normal compositional view makes category mistakes meaningful [Magidor]
If a category mistake is synonymous across two languages, that implies it is meaningful [Magidor]
If a category mistake has unimaginable truth-conditions, then it seems to be meaningless [Magidor]
Two good sentences should combine to make a good sentence, but that might be absurd [Magidor]
A good explanation of why category mistakes sound wrong is that they are meaningless [Magidor]
Category mistakes are neither verifiable nor analytic, so verificationism says they are meaningless [Magidor]
Category mistakes play no role in mental life, so conceptual role semantics makes them meaningless [Magidor]
Maybe when you say 'two is green', the predicate somehow fails to apply? [Magidor]
If category mistakes aren't syntax failure or meaningless, maybe they just lack a truth-value? [Magidor]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / d. Category mistake as pragmatic
Maybe the presuppositions of category mistakes are the abilities of things? [Magidor]
Category mistakes suffer from pragmatic presupposition failure (which is not mere triviality) [Magidor]
Category mistakes because of presuppositions still have a truth value (usually 'false') [Magidor]
In 'two is green', 'green' has a presupposition of being coloured [Magidor]
'Numbers are coloured and the number two is green' seems to be acceptable [Magidor]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / e. Category mistake as ontological
The presuppositions in category mistakes reveal nothing about ontology [Magidor]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
'The rug is green' might be warrantedly assertible even though the rug is not green [Putnam]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
We need the correspondence theory of truth to understand language and science [Putnam]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
Correspondence between concepts and unconceptualised reality is impossible [Putnam]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
In Tarski's definition, you understand 'true' if you accept the notions of the object language [Putnam]
Tarski has given a correct account of the formal logic of 'true', but there is more to the concept [Putnam]
Only Tarski has found a way to define 'true' [Putnam]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 8. Intensional Logic
Intensional logic maps logical space, showing which predicates are compatible or incompatible [Magidor]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / e. Caesar problem
Some suggest that the Julius Caesar problem involves category mistakes [Magidor]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Realism is a theory, which explains the convergence of science and the success of language [Putnam]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
We can explain the statue/clay problem by a category mistake with a false premise [Magidor]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
If a tautology is immune from revision, why would that make it true? [Putnam]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 7. Testimony
Knowledge depends on believing others, which must be innate, as inferences are not strong enough [Putnam]
Empathy may not give knowledge, but it can give plausibility or right opinion [Putnam]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / a. Explanation as pragmatic
You can't decide which explanations are good if you don't attend to the interest-relative aspects [Putnam]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 2. Propositional Attitudes
Propositional attitudes relate agents to either propositions, or meanings, or sentence/utterances [Magidor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Two sentences with different meanings can, on occasion, have the same content [Magidor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
To grasp 'two' and 'green', must you know that two is not green? [Magidor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Theory of meaning presupposes theory of understanding and reference [Putnam]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
Truth conditions can't explain understanding a sentence, because that in turn needs explanation [Putnam]
We should reject the view that truth is prior to meaning [Putnam]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
How reference is specified is not what reference is [Putnam]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
The claim that scientific terms are incommensurable can be blocked if scientific terms are not descriptions [Putnam]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 1. Syntax
Generative semantics says structure is determined by semantics as well as syntactic rules [Magidor]
'John is easy to please' and 'John is eager to please' have different deep structure [Magidor]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
The semantics of a sentence is its potential for changing a context [Magidor]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
Weaker compositionality says meaningful well-formed sentences get the meaning from the parts [Magidor]
Strong compositionality says meaningful expressions syntactically well-formed are meaningful [Magidor]
Understanding unlimited numbers of sentences suggests that meaning is compositional [Magidor]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / b. Propositions as possible worlds
Are there partial propositions, lacking truth value in some possible worlds? [Magidor]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
A private language could work with reference and beliefs, and wouldn't need meaning [Putnam]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
A sentence can be meaningful, and yet lack a truth value [Magidor]
In the pragmatic approach, presuppositions are assumed in a context, for successful assertion [Magidor]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature
The infelicitiousness of trivial truth is explained by uninformativeness, or a static context-set [Magidor]
The infelicitiousness of trivial falsity is explained by expectations, or the loss of a context-set [Magidor]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / c. Presupposition
A presupposition is what makes an utterance sound wrong if it is not assumed? [Magidor]
A test for presupposition would be if it provoked 'hey wait a minute - I have no idea that....' [Magidor]
The best tests for presupposition are projecting it to negation, conditional, conjunction, questions [Magidor]
If both s and not-s entail a sentence p, then p is a presupposition [Magidor]
Why do certain words trigger presuppositions? [Magidor]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
The correct translation is the one that explains the speaker's behaviour [Putnam]
Language maps the world in many ways (because it maps onto other languages in many ways) [Putnam]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
You can't say 'most speaker's beliefs are true'; in some areas this is not so, and you can't count beliefs [Putnam]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / d. Metaphor
One theory says metaphors mean the same as the corresponding simile [Magidor]
Theories of metaphor divide over whether they must have literal meanings [Magidor]
The simile view of metaphors removes their magic, and won't explain why we use them [Magidor]
Maybe a metaphor is just a substitute for what is intended literally, like 'icy' for 'unemotional' [Magidor]
Gricean theories of metaphor involve conversational implicatures based on literal meanings [Magidor]
Non-cognitivist views of metaphor says there are no metaphorical meanings, just effects of the literal [Magidor]
Metaphors tend to involve category mistakes, by joining disjoint domains [Magidor]
Metaphors as substitutes for the literal misses one predicate varying with context [Magidor]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
True goodness is political, and consists of love of and submission to the laws [Montesquieu]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / b. The natural life
Primitive people would be too vulnerable and timid to attack anyone, so peace would reign [Montesquieu]
Men do not desire to subjugate one another; domination is a complex and advanced idea [Montesquieu]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
People are drawn into society by needs, shared fears, pleasure, and knowledge [Montesquieu]
People are guided by a multitude of influences, from which the spirit of a nation emerges [Montesquieu]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 2. Population / b. State population
In small republics citizens identify with the public good, and abuses are fewer [Montesquieu]
In a large republic there is too much wealth for individuals to manage it [Montesquieu]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / b. Veil of ignorance
The rich would never submit to a lottery deciding which part of their society should be slaves [Montesquieu]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
All states aim at preservation, and then have distinctive individual purposes [Montesquieu]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / a. Autocracy
The natural power of a father suggests rule by one person, but that authority can be spread [Montesquieu]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / b. Monarchy
Monarchies can act more quickly, because one person is in charge [Montesquieu]
The nobility are an indispensable part of a monarchy [Montesquieu]
Monarchs must not just have links to the people; they need a body which maintains the laws [Montesquieu]
Ambition is good in a monarchy, because the monarch can always restrain it [Montesquieu]
In monarchies, men's actions are judged by their grand appearance, not their virtues [Montesquieu]
In a monarchy, the nobility must be hereditary, to bind them together [Montesquieu]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / c. Despotism
A despot's agents must be given power, so they inevitably become corrupt [Montesquieu]
Despotism and honour are incompatible, because honour scorns his power, and lives by rules [Montesquieu]
Tyranny is either real violence, or the imposition of unpopular legislation [Montesquieu]
Despots are always lazy and ignorant, so they always delegate their power to a vizier [Montesquieu]
The will of a despot is an enigma, so magistrates can only follow their own will [Montesquieu]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / d. Elites
If the nobility is numerous, the senate is the artistocracy, and the nobles are a democracy [Montesquieu]
Aristocracy is democratic if they resemble the people, but not if they resemble the monarch [Montesquieu]
Great inequality between aristocrats and the rest is bad - and also among aristocrats themselves [Montesquieu]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / a. Government
If a government is to be preserved, it must first be loved [Montesquieu]
A government has a legislature, an international executive, and a domestic executive [Montesquieu]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / b. Legislature
The judiciary must be separate from the legislature, to avoid arbitrary power [Montesquieu]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / b. Consultation
The fundamental laws of a democracy decide who can vote [Montesquieu]
It is basic to a democracy that the people themselves must name their ministers [Montesquieu]
Voting should be public, so the lower classes can be influenced by the example of notable people [Montesquieu]
All citizens (apart from the very humble poor) should choose their representatives [Montesquieu]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / c. Direct democracy
In a democracy the people should manage themselves, and only delegate what they can't do [Montesquieu]
A democratic assembly must have a fixed number, to see whether everyone has spoken [Montesquieu]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / d. Representative democracy
If deputies represent people, they are accountable, but less so if they represent places [Montesquieu]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
Slaves are not members of the society, so no law can forbid them to run away [Montesquieu]
Slavery is entirely bad; the master abandons the virtues, and they are pointless in the slave [Montesquieu]
The demand for slavery is just the masters' demand for luxury [Montesquieu]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 3. Free speech
Freedom of speech and writing, within the law, is essential to preserve liberty [Montesquieu]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Freedom in society is ability to do what is right, and not having to do what is wrong [Montesquieu]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
No one even thinks of equality in monarchies and despotism; they all want superiority [Montesquieu]
Equality is not command by everyone or no one, but command and obedience among equals [Montesquieu]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 2. Political equality
Democracy is corrupted by lack of equality, or by extreme equality (between rulers and ruled) [Montesquieu]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
Some equality can be achieved by social categories, combined with taxes and poor relief [Montesquieu]
Democracies may sometimes need to restrict equality [Montesquieu]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
Prior to positive laws there is natural equity, of obedience, gratitude, dependence and merit [Montesquieu]
Sensation gives animals natural laws, but knowledge can make them break them [Montesquieu]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
The death penalty is permissible, because its victims enjoyed the protection of that law [Montesquieu]
If religion teaches determinism, penalties must be severe; if free will, then that is different [Montesquieu]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / d. Non-combatants
The only right victors have over captives is the protection of the former [Montesquieu]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 2. Religion in Society
The clergy are essential to a monarchy, but dangerous in a republic [Montesquieu]
Religion has the most influence in despotic states, and reinforces veneration for the ruler [Montesquieu]
Religion can support the state when the law fails to do so [Montesquieu]
French slavery was accepted because it was the best method of religious conversion [Montesquieu]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
In monarchies education ennobles people, and in despotisms it debases them [Montesquieu]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
Teaching is the best practice of the general virtue that leads us to love everyone [Montesquieu]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
Laws are the necessary relations that derive from the nature of things [Montesquieu]