57 ideas
| 6267 | A culture needs to admit that knowledge is more extensive than just 'science' [Putnam] |
| 6272 | 'True' and 'refers' cannot be made scientically precise, but are fundamental to science [Putnam] |
| 6276 | 'The rug is green' might be warrantedly assertible even though the rug is not green [Putnam] |
| 6266 | We need the correspondence theory of truth to understand language and science [Putnam] |
| 6277 | Correspondence between concepts and unconceptualised reality is impossible [Putnam] |
| 6264 | In Tarski's definition, you understand 'true' if you accept the notions of the object language [Putnam] |
| 6265 | Tarski has given a correct account of the formal logic of 'true', but there is more to the concept [Putnam] |
| 6269 | Only Tarski has found a way to define 'true' [Putnam] |
| 17536 | If it can't be expressed mathematically, it can't occur in nature? [Heisenberg] |
| 17545 | Quantum theory shows that exact science does not need dogmatic realism [Heisenberg] |
| 6280 | Realism is a theory, which explains the convergence of science and the success of language [Putnam] |
| 17538 | Quantum theory does not introduce minds into atomic events [Heisenberg] |
| 17534 | A 'probability wave' is a quantitative version of Aristotle's potential, a mid-way type of reality [Heisenberg] |
| 11897 | A principle of individuation may pinpoint identity and distinctness, now and over time [Mackie,P] |
| 11898 | Individuation may include counterfactual possibilities, as well as identity and persistence [Mackie,P] |
| 11883 | A haecceity is the essential, simple, unanalysable property of being-this-thing [Mackie,P] |
| 17553 | We can retain the idea of 'substance', as indestructible mass or energy [Heisenberg] |
| 17544 | Basic particles have a mathematical form, which is more important than their substance [Heisenberg] |
| 11889 | Essentialism must avoid both reduplication of essences, and multiple occupancy by essences [Mackie,P] |
| 11877 | An individual essence is the properties the object could not exist without [Mackie,P] |
| 11882 | No other object can possibly have the same individual essence as some object [Mackie,P] |
| 11886 | There are problems both with individual essences and without them [Mackie,P] |
| 11909 | Unlike Hesperus=Phosophorus, water=H2O needs further premisses before it is necessary [Mackie,P] |
| 11899 | Why are any sortals essential, and why are only some of them essential? [Mackie,P] |
| 11906 | The Kripke and Putnam view of kinds makes them explanatorily basic, but has modal implications [Mackie,P] |
| 11894 | Origin is not a necessity, it is just 'tenacious'; we keep it fixed in counterfactual discussions [Mackie,P] |
| 11887 | Transworld identity without individual essences leads to 'bare identities' [Mackie,P] |
| 11890 | De re modality without bare identities or individual essence needs counterparts [Mackie,P] |
| 11892 | Things may only be counterparts under some particular relation [Mackie,P] |
| 11893 | Possibilities for Caesar must be based on some phase of the real Caesar [Mackie,P] |
| 11884 | The theory of 'haecceitism' does not need commitment to individual haecceities [Mackie,P] |
| 6284 | If a tautology is immune from revision, why would that make it true? [Putnam] |
| 6273 | Knowledge depends on believing others, which must be innate, as inferences are not strong enough [Putnam] |
| 6274 | Empathy may not give knowledge, but it can give plausibility or right opinion [Putnam] |
| 17550 | We give a mathematical account of a system of natural connections in order to clarify them [Heisenberg] |
| 11905 | Locke's kind essences are explanatory, without being necessary to the kind [Mackie,P] |
| 17084 | You can't decide which explanations are good if you don't attend to the interest-relative aspects [Putnam] |
| 6282 | Theory of meaning presupposes theory of understanding and reference [Putnam] |
| 6281 | Truth conditions can't explain understanding a sentence, because that in turn needs explanation [Putnam] |
| 6278 | We should reject the view that truth is prior to meaning [Putnam] |
| 6271 | How reference is specified is not what reference is [Putnam] |
| 6268 | The claim that scientific terms are incommensurable can be blocked if scientific terms are not descriptions [Putnam] |
| 6279 | A private language could work with reference and beliefs, and wouldn't need meaning [Putnam] |
| 6270 | The correct translation is the one that explains the speaker's behaviour [Putnam] |
| 6283 | Language maps the world in many ways (because it maps onto other languages in many ways) [Putnam] |
| 6275 | You can't say 'most speaker's beliefs are true'; in some areas this is not so, and you can't count beliefs [Putnam] |
| 11907 | Maybe the identity of kinds is necessary, but instances being of that kind is not [Mackie,P] |
| 17549 | Seven theories in science: mechanics, heat, electricity, quantum, particles, relativity, life [Heisenberg, by PG] |
| 17540 | Energy is that which moves, and is the substance from which everything is made [Heisenberg] |
| 17541 | Energy is an unchanging substance, having many forms, and causing all change [Heisenberg] |
| 17548 | Maxwell introduced real fields, which transferred forces from point to point [Heisenberg] |
| 17533 | Radiation interference needs waves, but radiation photoelectric effects needs particles [Heisenberg] |
| 17532 | An atom's stability after collisions needs explaining (which Newton's mechanics can't do) [Heisenberg] |
| 17537 | Position is complementary to velocity or momentum, so the whole system is indeterminate [Heisenberg] |
| 17551 | It was formerly assumed that electromagnetic waves could not be a reality in themselves [Heisenberg] |
| 17543 | So-called 'empty' space is the carrier of geometry and kinematics [Heisenberg] |
| 17552 | In relativity the length of the 'present moment' is relative to distance from the observer [Heisenberg] |