Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Nature of Mental States', 'Interview with Baggini and Stangroom' and 'Intuitionism'

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14 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
6851 We overvalue whether arguments are valid, and undervalue whether they are interesting [Monk]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
2590 Dispositions need mental terms to define them [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
2591 Total paralysis would mean that there were mental states but no behaviour at all [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
2588 Is pain a functional state of a complete organism? [Putnam]
2589 Functionalism is compatible with dualism, as pure mind could perform the functions [Putnam]
2592 Functional states correlate with AND explain pain behaviour [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
2587 Temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy, but they are two different concepts [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
6376 Neuroscience does not support multiple realisability, and tends to support identity [Polger on Putnam]
2330 If humans and molluscs both feel pain, it can't be a single biological state [Putnam, by Kim]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / c. Purpose of ethics
6850 Wittgenstein pared his life down in his search for decency [Monk]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
7260 If there are intuited moral facts, why should we care about them? [Dancy,J]
7261 Internalists say that moral intuitions are motivating; externalist say a desire is also needed [Dancy,J]
7262 Obviously judging an action as wrong gives us a reason not to do it [Dancy,J]
7265 Moral facts are not perceived facts, but perceived reasons for judgements [Dancy,J]