15 ideas
| 22353 | One view says objectivity is making a successful claim which captures the facts [Reiss/Sprenger] |
| 22356 | An absolute scientific picture of reality must not involve sense experience, which is perspectival [Reiss/Sprenger] |
| 22359 | Topic and application involve values, but can evidence and theory choice avoid them? [Reiss/Sprenger] |
| 22360 | The Value-Free Ideal in science avoids contextual values, but embraces epistemic values [Reiss/Sprenger] |
| 22362 | Value-free science needs impartial evaluation, theories asserting facts, and right motivation [Reiss/Sprenger] |
| 22364 | Thermometers depend on the substance used, and none of them are perfect [Reiss/Sprenger] |
| 9944 | We understand some statements about all sets [Putnam] |
| 9937 | I do not believe mathematics either has or needs 'foundations' [Putnam] |
| 9939 | It is conceivable that the axioms of arithmetic or propositional logic might be changed [Putnam] |
| 9940 | Maybe mathematics is empirical in that we could try to change it [Putnam] |
| 9941 | Science requires more than consistency of mathematics [Putnam] |
| 9943 | You can't deny a hypothesis a truth-value simply because we may never know it! [Putnam] |
| 9382 | Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications' [Burge] |
| 22357 | The 'experimenter's regress' says success needs reliability, which is only tested by success [Reiss/Sprenger] |
| 22365 | The Bayesian approach is explicitly subjective about probabilities [Reiss/Sprenger] |