79 ideas
3656 | The greatest good for a state is true philosophers [Descartes] |
6267 | A culture needs to admit that knowledge is more extensive than just 'science' [Putnam] |
6272 | 'True' and 'refers' cannot be made scientically precise, but are fundamental to science [Putnam] |
6276 | 'The rug is green' might be warrantedly assertible even though the rug is not green [Putnam] |
6266 | We need the correspondence theory of truth to understand language and science [Putnam] |
6277 | Correspondence between concepts and unconceptualised reality is impossible [Putnam] |
6264 | In Tarski's definition, you understand 'true' if you accept the notions of the object language [Putnam] |
6265 | Tarski has given a correct account of the formal logic of 'true', but there is more to the concept [Putnam] |
6269 | Only Tarski has found a way to define 'true' [Putnam] |
9449 | The plausible Barcan formula implies modality in the actual world [Bird] |
9501 | If all existents are causally active, that excludes abstracta and causally isolated objects [Bird] |
9500 | If naturalism refers to supervenience, that leaves necessary entities untouched [Bird] |
6280 | Realism is a theory, which explains the convergence of science and the success of language [Putnam] |
9502 | There might be just one fundamental natural property [Bird] |
9477 | Categorical properties are not modally fixed, but change across possible worlds [Bird] |
9490 | The categoricalist idea is that a property is only individuated by being itself [Bird] |
9495 | If we abstractly define a property, that doesn't mean some object could possess it [Bird] |
9492 | Categoricalists take properties to be quiddities, with no essential difference between them [Bird] |
9503 | To name an abundant property is either a Fregean concept, or a simple predicate [Bird] |
14540 | Only real powers are fundamental [Bird, by Mumford/Anjum] |
16744 | All powers can be explained by obvious features like size, shape and motion of matter [Descartes] |
9450 | If all properties are potencies, and stimuli and manifestation characterise them, there is a regress [Bird] |
9498 | The essence of a potency involves relations, e.g. mass, to impressed force and acceleration [Bird] |
9474 | A disposition is finkish if a time delay might mean the manifestation fizzles out [Bird] |
9475 | A robust pot attached to a sensitive bomb is not fragile, but if struck it will easily break [Bird] |
9499 | Megarian actualists deny unmanifested dispositions [Bird] |
5016 | Five universals: genus, species, difference, property, accident [Descartes] |
9486 | Why should a universal's existence depend on instantiation in an existing particular? [Bird] |
5015 | A universal is a single idea applied to individual things that are similar to one another [Descartes] |
9472 | Resemblance itself needs explanation, presumably in terms of something held in common [Bird] |
16630 | If we perceive an attribute, we infer the existence of some substance [Descartes] |
5013 | A substance needs nothing else in order to exist [Descartes] |
16633 | A substance has one principal property which is its nature and essence [Descartes] |
9482 | If the laws necessarily imply p, that doesn't give a new 'nomological' necessity [Bird] |
9481 | Logical necessitation is not a kind of necessity; George Orwell not being Eric Blair is not a real possibility [Bird] |
9505 | Empiricist saw imaginability and possibility as close, but now they seem remote [Bird] |
9491 | Haecceitism says identity is independent of qualities and without essence [Bird] |
3658 | Total doubt can't include your existence while doubting [Descartes] |
5005 | I think, therefore I am, because for a thinking thing to not exist is a contradiction [Descartes] |
5006 | 'Thought' is all our conscious awareness, including feeling as well as understanding [Descartes] |
5012 | 'Nothing comes from nothing' is an eternal truth found within the mind [Descartes] |
6284 | If a tautology is immune from revision, why would that make it true? [Putnam] |
5004 | We can know basic Principles without further knowledge, but not the other way round [Descartes] |
6273 | Knowledge depends on believing others, which must be innate, as inferences are not strong enough [Putnam] |
6274 | Empathy may not give knowledge, but it can give plausibility or right opinion [Putnam] |
9487 | We can't reject all explanations because of a regress; inexplicable A can still explain B [Bird] |
17084 | You can't decide which explanations are good if you don't attend to the interest-relative aspects [Putnam] |
5014 | We can understand thinking occuring without imagination or sensation [Descartes] |
5017 | In thinking we shut ourselves off from other substances, showing our identity and separateness [Descartes] |
5010 | Our free will is so self-evident to us that it must be a basic innate idea [Descartes] |
5011 | There are two ultimate classes of existence: thinking substance and extended substance [Descartes] |
5018 | Even if tightly united, mind and body are different, as God could separate them [Descartes] |
5007 | Most errors of judgement result from an inaccurate perception of the facts [Descartes] |
6282 | Theory of meaning presupposes theory of understanding and reference [Putnam] |
6281 | Truth conditions can't explain understanding a sentence, because that in turn needs explanation [Putnam] |
6278 | We should reject the view that truth is prior to meaning [Putnam] |
6271 | How reference is specified is not what reference is [Putnam] |
6268 | The claim that scientific terms are incommensurable can be blocked if scientific terms are not descriptions [Putnam] |
6279 | A private language could work with reference and beliefs, and wouldn't need meaning [Putnam] |
6270 | The correct translation is the one that explains the speaker's behaviour [Putnam] |
6283 | Language maps the world in many ways (because it maps onto other languages in many ways) [Putnam] |
6275 | You can't say 'most speaker's beliefs are true'; in some areas this is not so, and you can't count beliefs [Putnam] |
5009 | We do not praise the acts of an efficient automaton, as their acts are necessary [Descartes] |
5008 | The greatest perfection of man is to act by free will, and thus merit praise or blame [Descartes] |
15987 | Physics only needs geometry or abstract mathematics, which can explain and demonstrate everything [Descartes] |
12730 | We will not try to understand natural or divine ends, or final causes [Descartes] |
16601 | Matter is not hard, heavy or coloured, but merely extended in space [Descartes] |
9493 | We should explain causation by powers, not powers by causation [Bird] |
9494 | Singularism about causes is wrong, as the universals involved imply laws [Bird] |
9507 | Laws are explanatory relationships of things, which supervene on their essences [Bird] |
9488 | Laws are either disposition regularities, or relations between properties [Bird] |
9496 | That other diamonds are hard does not explain why this one is [Bird] |
9479 | Dispositional essentialism says laws (and laws about laws) are guaranteed regularities [Bird] |
9473 | Laws cannot offer unified explanations if they don't involve universals [Bird] |
9484 | If the universals for laws must be instantiated, a vanishing particular could destroy a law [Bird] |
9506 | Salt necessarily dissolves in water, because of the law which makes the existence of salt possible [Bird] |
23713 | Most laws supervene on fundamental laws, which are explained by basic powers [Bird, by Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
9489 | Essentialism can't use conditionals to explain regularities, because of possible interventions [Bird] |
9504 | The relational view of space-time doesn't cover times and places where things could be [Bird] |