Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Meaning and the Moral Sciences', 'Principles of Philosophy' and 'The View from Nowhere'

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69 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
There is more insight in fundamental perplexity about problems than in their supposed solutions [Nagel]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Philosophy is the childhood of the intellect, and a culture can't skip it [Nagel]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
The greatest good for a state is true philosophers [Descartes]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
It seems mad, but the aim of philosophy is to climb outside of our own minds [Nagel]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
A culture needs to admit that knowledge is more extensive than just 'science' [Putnam]
'True' and 'refers' cannot be made scientically precise, but are fundamental to science [Putnam]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Views are objective if they don't rely on a person's character, social position or species [Nagel]
Things cause perceptions, properties have other effects, hence we reach a 'view from nowhere' [Nagel, by Reiss/Sprenger]
Realism invites scepticism because it claims to be objective [Nagel]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
'The rug is green' might be warrantedly assertible even though the rug is not green [Putnam]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
We need the correspondence theory of truth to understand language and science [Putnam]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
Correspondence between concepts and unconceptualised reality is impossible [Putnam]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
In Tarski's definition, you understand 'true' if you accept the notions of the object language [Putnam]
Tarski has given a correct account of the formal logic of 'true', but there is more to the concept [Putnam]
Only Tarski has found a way to define 'true' [Putnam]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Realism is a theory, which explains the convergence of science and the success of language [Putnam]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
All powers can be explained by obvious features like size, shape and motion of matter [Descartes]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Five universals: genus, species, difference, property, accident [Descartes]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
A universal is a single idea applied to individual things that are similar to one another [Descartes]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
If we perceive an attribute, we infer the existence of some substance [Descartes]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
A substance needs nothing else in order to exist [Descartes]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
A substance has one principal property which is its nature and essence [Descartes]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
Total doubt can't include your existence while doubting [Descartes]
I think, therefore I am, because for a thinking thing to not exist is a contradiction [Descartes]
'Thought' is all our conscious awareness, including feeling as well as understanding [Descartes]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
'Nothing comes from nothing' is an eternal truth found within the mind [Descartes]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
If a tautology is immune from revision, why would that make it true? [Putnam]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
Modern science depends on the distinction between primary and secondary qualities [Nagel]
We achieve objectivity by dropping secondary qualities, to focus on structural primary qualities [Nagel]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
Epistemology is centrally about what we should believe, not the definition of knowledge [Nagel]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
We can know basic Principles without further knowledge, but not the other way round [Descartes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 7. Testimony
Knowledge depends on believing others, which must be innate, as inferences are not strong enough [Putnam]
Empathy may not give knowledge, but it can give plausibility or right opinion [Putnam]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Scepticism is based on ideas which scepticism makes impossible [Nagel]
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
Observed regularities are only predictable if we assume hidden necessity [Nagel]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / a. Explanation as pragmatic
You can't decide which explanations are good if you don't attend to the interest-relative aspects [Putnam]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
We can understand thinking occuring without imagination or sensation [Descartes]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
Personal identity cannot be fully known a priori [Nagel]
The question of whether a future experience will be mine presupposes personal identity [Nagel]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 4. Split Consciousness
I can't even conceive of my brain being split in two [Nagel]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 7. Self and Thinking
In thinking we shut ourselves off from other substances, showing our identity and separateness [Descartes]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Our free will is so self-evident to us that it must be a basic innate idea [Descartes]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
There are two ultimate classes of existence: thinking substance and extended substance [Descartes]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
Even if tightly united, mind and body are different, as God could separate them [Descartes]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / b. Error
Most errors of judgement result from an inaccurate perception of the facts [Descartes]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Theory of meaning presupposes theory of understanding and reference [Putnam]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
Truth conditions can't explain understanding a sentence, because that in turn needs explanation [Putnam]
We should reject the view that truth is prior to meaning [Putnam]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
How reference is specified is not what reference is [Putnam]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
The claim that scientific terms are incommensurable can be blocked if scientific terms are not descriptions [Putnam]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
A private language could work with reference and beliefs, and wouldn't need meaning [Putnam]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
The correct translation is the one that explains the speaker's behaviour [Putnam]
Language maps the world in many ways (because it maps onto other languages in many ways) [Putnam]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
You can't say 'most speaker's beliefs are true'; in some areas this is not so, and you can't count beliefs [Putnam]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
The greatest perfection of man is to act by free will, and thus merit praise or blame [Descartes]
We do not praise the acts of an efficient automaton, as their acts are necessary [Descartes]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
Total objectivity can't see value, but it sees many people with values [Nagel]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
We don't worry about the time before we were born the way we worry about death [Nagel]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
If our own life lacks meaning, devotion to others won't give it meaning [Nagel]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
Pain doesn't have a further property of badness; it gives a reason for its avoidance [Nagel]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
Something may be 'rational' either because it is required or because it is acceptable [Nagel]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
If cockroaches can't think about their actions, they have no duties [Nagel]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
If we can decide how to live after stepping outside of ourselves, we have the basis of a moral theory [Nagel]
We should see others' viewpoints, but not lose touch with our own values [Nagel]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
We find new motives by discovering reasons for action different from our preexisting motives [Nagel]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 3. Motivation for Altruism
Utilitarianism is too demanding [Nagel]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Physics only needs geometry or abstract mathematics, which can explain and demonstrate everything [Descartes]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
We will not try to understand natural or divine ends, or final causes [Descartes]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / c. Matter as extension
Matter is not hard, heavy or coloured, but merely extended in space [Descartes]