Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Nature of Mental States', 'Causal and Metaphysical Necessity' and 'The Art of the Infinite'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

24 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
15717 Using Choice, you can cut up a small ball and make an enormous one from the pieces [Kaplan/Kaplan]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
15091 Restrict 'logical truth' to formal logic, rather than including analytic and metaphysical truths [Shoemaker]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
15712 1 and 0, then add for naturals, subtract for negatives, divide for rationals, take roots for irrationals [Kaplan/Kaplan]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
15711 The rationals are everywhere - the irrationals are everywhere else [Kaplan/Kaplan]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / f. Arithmetic
15714 'Commutative' laws say order makes no difference; 'associative' laws say groupings make no difference [Kaplan/Kaplan]
15715 'Distributive' laws say if you add then multiply, or multiply then add, you get the same result [Kaplan/Kaplan]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
15095 A property's causal features are essential, and only they fix its identity [Shoemaker]
15097 I claim that a property has its causal features in all possible worlds [Shoemaker]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
15094 I now deny that properties are cluster of powers, and take causal properties as basic [Shoemaker]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
15099 If something is possible, but not nomologically possible, we need metaphysical possibility [Shoemaker]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
15101 Once you give up necessity as a priori, causal necessity becomes the main type of necessity [Shoemaker]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
15098 Empirical evidence shows that imagining a phenomenon can show it is possible [Shoemaker]
15100 Imagination reveals conceptual possibility, where descriptions avoid contradiction or incoherence [Shoemaker]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
15713 The first million numbers confirm that no number is greater than a million [Kaplan/Kaplan]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
15096 'Grue' only has causal features because of its relation to green [Shoemaker]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
2590 Dispositions need mental terms to define them [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
2591 Total paralysis would mean that there were mental states but no behaviour at all [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
2588 Is pain a functional state of a complete organism? [Putnam]
2589 Functionalism is compatible with dualism, as pure mind could perform the functions [Putnam]
2592 Functional states correlate with AND explain pain behaviour [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
2587 Temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy, but they are two different concepts [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
6376 Neuroscience does not support multiple realisability, and tends to support identity [Polger on Putnam]
2330 If humans and molluscs both feel pain, it can't be a single biological state [Putnam, by Kim]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals
15093 We might say laws are necessary by combining causal properties with Armstrong-Dretske-Tooley laws [Shoemaker]