13 ideas
| 6782 | Realism is the only philosophy of science that doesn't make the success of science a miracle [Putnam] |
| 18823 | To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt] |
| 16052 | 'Superdupervenience' is supervenience that has a robustly materialistic explanation [Horgan,T] |
| 16053 | 'Global' supervenience is facts tracking varying physical facts in every possible world [Horgan,T] |
| 16056 | Don't just observe supervenience - explain it! [Horgan,T] |
| 22181 | Putnam says anti-realism is a bad explanation of accurate predictions [Putnam, by Okasha] |
| 16054 | Physicalism needs more than global supervenience on the physical [Horgan,T] |
| 16055 | Materialism requires that physics be causally complete [Horgan,T] |
| 16409 | Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker] |
| 16411 | If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker] |
| 16412 | If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker] |
| 16057 | Instrumentalism normally says some discourse is useful, but not genuinely true [Horgan,T] |
| 16410 | Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker] |