Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Mental Life of Some Machines', 'Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo' and 'Natural Minds'

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24 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
We are coerced into assent to a truth by reason's violence [Aquinas]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
The mind is compelled by necessary truths, but not by contingent truths [Aquinas]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
For the mind Good is one truth among many, and Truth is one good among many [Aquinas]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
The taste of chocolate is a 'finer-grained' sensation than the taste of sweetness [Polger]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Knowledge may be based on senses, but we needn't sense all our knowledge [Aquinas]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 1. Self and Consciousness
The mind and the self are one, and the mind-self is a biological phenomenon [Polger]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 3. Constraints on the will
If we saw something as totally and utterly good, we would be compelled to will it [Aquinas]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
Nothing can be willed except what is good, but good is very varied, and so choices are unpredictable [Aquinas]
However habituated you are, given time to ponder you can go against a habit [Aquinas]
Since will is a reasoning power, it can entertain opposites, so it is not compelled to embrace one of them [Aquinas]
The will is not compelled to move, even if pleasant things are set before it [Aquinas]
Because the will moves by examining alternatives, it doesn't compel itself to will [Aquinas]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
We must admit that when the will is not willing something, the first movement to will must come from outside the will [Aquinas]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
Instances of pain are physical tokens, but the nature of pain is more abstract [Putnam, by Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 5. Teleological Functionalism
Teleological functions explain why a trait exists; causal-role functions say what it does [Polger]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Identity theory says consciousness is an abstraction: a state, event, process or property [Polger]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
The will must aim at happiness, but can choose the means [Aquinas]
We don't have to will even perfect good, because we can choose not to think of it [Aquinas]
The will can only want what it thinks is good [Aquinas]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Without free will not only is ethical action meaningless, but also planning, commanding, praising and blaming [Aquinas]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
Good applies to goals, just as truth applies to ideas in the mind [Aquinas]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 3. Natural Function
A mummified heart has the teleological function of circulating blood [Polger]
Teleological notions of function say what a thing is supposed to do [Polger]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
Even a sufficient cause doesn't compel its effect, because interference could interrupt the process [Aquinas]