47 ideas
2352 | The job of the philosopher is to distinguish facts about the world from conventions [Putnam] |
15134 | The truthmaker principle requires some specific named thing to make the difference [Williamson] |
15141 | Truthmaker is incompatible with modal semantics of varying domains [Williamson] |
15140 | The converse Barcan formula will not allow contingent truths to have truthmakers [Williamson] |
2345 | Semantic notions do not occur in Tarski's definitions, but assessing their correctness involves translation [Putnam] |
2347 | Asserting the truth of an indexical statement is not the same as uttering the statement [Putnam] |
15131 | If metaphysical possibility is not a contingent matter, then S5 seems to suit it best [Williamson] |
15135 | If the domain of propositional quantification is constant, the Barcan formulas hold [Williamson] |
15139 | Converse Barcan: could something fail to meet a condition, if everything meets that condition? [Williamson] |
18492 | Not all quantification is either objectual or substitutional [Williamson] |
15136 | Substitutional quantification is metaphysical neutral, and equivalent to a disjunction of instances [Williamson] |
15138 | Not all quantification is objectual or substitutional [Williamson] |
2349 | Realists believe truth is correspondence, independent of humans, is bivalent, and is unique [Putnam] |
15137 | If 'fact' is a noun, can we name the fact that dogs bark 'Mary'? [Williamson] |
2351 | Aristotle says an object (e.g. a lamp) has identity if its parts stay together when it is moved [Putnam] |
15142 | Our ability to count objects across possibilities favours the Barcan formulas [Williamson] |
2331 | Functionalism says robots and people are the same at one level of abstraction [Putnam] |
2071 | If concepts have external meaning, computational states won't explain psychology [Putnam] |
2332 | Functionalism can't explain reference and truth, which are needed for logic [Putnam] |
2348 | Is there just one computational state for each specific belief? [Putnam] |
2344 | If we are going to eliminate folk psychology, we must also eliminate folk logic [Putnam] |
2074 | Can we give a scientific, computational account of folk psychology? [Putnam] |
2343 | Reference may be different while mental representation is the same [Putnam] |
2346 | Meaning and translation (which are needed to define truth) both presuppose the notion of reference [Putnam] |
2354 | "Meaning is use" is not a definition of meaning [Putnam] |
2336 | Holism seems to make fixed definition more or less impossible [Putnam] |
2334 | Meaning holism tried to show that you can't get fixed meanings built out of observation terms [Putnam] |
2335 | Understanding a sentence involves background knowledge and can't be done in isolation [Putnam] |
2340 | We should separate how the reference of 'gold' is fixed from its conceptual content [Putnam] |
2341 | Like names, natural kind terms have their meaning fixed by extension and reference [Putnam] |
2339 | Aristotle implies that we have the complete concepts of a language in our heads, but we don't [Putnam] |
2338 | Reference (say to 'elms') is a social phenomenon which we can leave to experts [Putnam] |
3926 | The human heart has a natural concern for public good [Hume] |
3929 | No moral theory is of any use if it doesn't serve the interests of the individual concerned [Hume] |
3925 | Personal Merit is the possession of useful or agreeable mental qualities [Hume] |
3922 | Justice only exists to support society [Hume] |
23560 | If we all naturally had everything we could ever desire, the virtue of justice would be irrelevant [Hume] |
3918 | Moral philosophy aims to show us our duty [Hume] |
3919 | Conclusions of reason do not affect our emotions or decisions to act [Hume] |
3928 | Virtue just requires careful calculation and a preference for the greater happiness [Hume] |
3923 | No one would cause pain to a complete stranger who happened to be passing [Hume] |
3924 | Nature makes private affections come first, because public concerns are spread too thinly [Hume] |
3921 | The safety of the people is the supreme law [Hume] |
3927 | Society prefers helpful lies to harmful truth [Hume] |
3920 | If you equalise possessions, people's talents will make them unequal again [Hume] |
2342 | "Water" is a natural kind term, but "H2O" is a description [Putnam] |
15133 | A thing can't be the only necessary existent, because its singleton set would be as well [Williamson] |