Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Aristotle and the Metaphysics' and 'On Concept and Object'

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15 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
Realism is the only philosophy of science that doesn't make the success of science a miracle [Putnam]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
The Pythagoreans were the first to offer definitions [Politis, by Politis]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 4. Uses of Truth
'True of' is applicable to things, while 'true' is applicable to words [Politis]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
A thought can be split in many ways, so that different parts appear as subject or predicate [Frege]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
There is the concept, the object falling under it, and the extension (a set, which is also an object) [Frege, by George/Velleman]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
Maybe 'What is being? is confusing because we can't ask what non-being is like [Politis]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Frege mistakenly takes existence to be a property of concepts, instead of being about things [Frege, by Yablo]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Putnam says anti-realism is a bad explanation of accurate predictions [Putnam, by Okasha]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
It is unclear whether Frege included qualities among his abstract objects [Frege, by Hale]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
Frege's 'objects' are both the referents of proper names, and what predicates are true or false of [Frege, by Dummett]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
Necessary truths can be two-way relational, where essential truths are one-way or intrinsic [Politis]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
Frege equated the concepts under which an object falls with its properties [Frege, by Dummett]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / b. Concepts are linguistic
As I understand it, a concept is the meaning of a grammatical predicate [Frege]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
Frege felt that meanings must be public, so they are abstractions rather than mental entities [Frege, by Putnam]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
For all the multiplicity of languages, mankind has a common stock of thoughts [Frege]