16 ideas
| 5437 | The claim of hermeneutics to give knowledge through understanding is challenged by positivism [Mautner on Dilthey] |
| 5436 | Natural science seeks explanation; human sciences seek understanding [Dilthey, by Mautner] |
| 2534 | Mindless bodies are zombies, bodiless minds are ghosts [Sturgeon] |
| 2537 | Types are properties, and tokens are events. Are they split between mental and physical, or not? [Sturgeon] |
| 2532 | Intentionality isn't reducible, because of its experiential aspect [Sturgeon] |
| 2590 | Dispositions need mental terms to define them [Putnam] |
| 2591 | Total paralysis would mean that there were mental states but no behaviour at all [Putnam] |
| 2588 | Is pain a functional state of a complete organism? [Putnam] |
| 2589 | Functionalism is compatible with dualism, as pure mind could perform the functions [Putnam] |
| 2592 | Functional states correlate with AND explain pain behaviour [Putnam] |
| 2533 | Rule-following can't be reduced to the physical [Sturgeon] |
| 2587 | Temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy, but they are two different concepts [Putnam] |
| 2535 | The main argument for physicalism is its simple account of causation [Sturgeon] |
| 6376 | Neuroscience does not support multiple realisability, and tends to support identity [Polger on Putnam] |
| 2330 | If humans and molluscs both feel pain, it can't be a single biological state [Putnam, by Kim] |
| 2536 | Do facts cause thoughts, or embody them, or what? [Sturgeon] |