12 ideas
| 22153 | Quine rejects Carnap's view that science and philosophy are distinct [Quine, by Boulter] |
| 6782 | Realism is the only philosophy of science that doesn't make the success of science a miracle [Putnam] |
| 11970 | Logicians like their entities to exhibit a maximum degree of purity [Kaplan] |
| 22181 | Putnam says anti-realism is a bad explanation of accurate predictions [Putnam, by Okasha] |
| 19485 | Names have no ontological commitment, because we can deny that they name anything [Quine] |
| 19486 | We can use quantification for commitment to unnameable things like the real numbers [Quine] |
| 11969 | Models nicely separate particulars from their clothing, and logicians often accept that metaphysically [Kaplan] |
| 11971 | The simplest solution to transworld identification is to adopt bare particulars [Kaplan] |
| 11972 | Essence is a transworld heir line, rather than a collection of properties [Kaplan] |
| 11973 | Unusual people may have no counterparts, or several [Kaplan] |
| 11967 | Sentences might have the same sense when logically equivalent - or never have the same sense [Kaplan] |
| 19487 | Without the analytic/synthetic distinction, Carnap's ontology/empirical distinction collapses [Quine] |