14 ideas
6782 | Realism is the only philosophy of science that doesn't make the success of science a miracle [Putnam] |
11178 | The essence or definition of an essence involves either a class of properties or a class of propositions [Fine,K] |
10779 | A comprehension axiom is 'predicative' if the formula has no bound second-order variables [Linnebo] |
10781 | A 'pure logic' must be ontologically innocent, universal, and without presuppositions [Linnebo] |
11175 | Logical concepts rest on certain inferences, not on facts about implications [Fine,K] |
11176 | The property of Property Abstraction says any suitable condition must imply a property [Fine,K] |
10778 | Can second-order logic be ontologically first-order, with all the benefits of second-order? [Linnebo] |
10783 | Plural quantification depends too heavily on combinatorial and set-theoretic considerations [Linnebo] |
11174 | A logical truth is true in virtue of the nature of the logical concepts [Fine,K] |
22181 | Putnam says anti-realism is a bad explanation of accurate predictions [Putnam, by Okasha] |
10782 | The modern concept of an object is rooted in quantificational logic [Linnebo] |
11177 | Can the essence of an object circularly involve itself, or involve another object? [Fine,K] |
11173 | Being a man is a consequence of his essence, not constitutive of it [Fine,K] |
11179 | If there are alternative definitions, then we have three possibilities for essence [Fine,K] |