Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Contingent Identity' and 'On the Ultimate Origination of Things'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


22 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom involves the desire to achieve perfection [Leibniz]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
Leibniz first asked 'why is there something rather than nothing?' [Leibniz, by Jacquette]
There must be a straining towards existence in the essence of all possible things [Leibniz]
Because something does exist, there must be a drive in possible things towards existence [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
If a statue is identical with the clay of which it is made, that identity is contingent [Gibbard]
A 'piece' of clay begins when its parts stick together, separately from other clay [Gibbard]
Clay and statue are two objects, which can be named and reasoned about [Gibbard]
We can only investigate the identity once we have designated it as 'statue' or as 'clay' [Gibbard]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
Essentialism is the existence of a definite answer as to whether an entity fulfils a condition [Gibbard]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Essentialism for concreta is false, since they can come apart under two concepts [Gibbard]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
A particular statue has sortal persistence conditions, so its origin defines it [Gibbard]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Claims on contingent identity seem to violate Leibniz's Law [Gibbard]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
Two identical things must share properties - including creation and destruction times [Gibbard]
Leibniz's Law isn't just about substitutivity, because it must involve properties and relations [Gibbard]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
The world is physically necessary, as its contrary would imply imperfection or moral absurdity [Leibniz]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
Possible worlds identity needs a sortal [Gibbard]
Only concepts, not individuals, can be the same across possible worlds [Gibbard]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
Kripke's semantics needs lots of intuitions about which properties are essential [Gibbard]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 2. Knowledge as Convention
By nature people are close to one another, but culture drives them apart [Hippias]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
Naming a thing in the actual world also invokes some persistence criteria [Gibbard]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
We follow the practical rule which always seeks maximum effect for minimum cost [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
The principle of determination in things obtains the greatest effect with the least effort [Leibniz]