28 ideas
4036 | What matters is not how many entities we postulate, but how many kinds of entities [Armstrong, by Mellor/Oliver] |
15754 | Without properties we would be unable to express the laws of nature [Armstrong] |
4034 | Whether we apply 'cold' or 'hot' to an object is quite separate from its change of temperature [Armstrong] |
8535 | To the claim that every predicate has a property, start by eliminating failure of application of predicate [Armstrong] |
8537 | Tropes fall into classes, because exact similarity is symmetrical and transitive [Armstrong] |
8538 | Trope theory needs extra commitments, to symmetry and non-transitivity, unless resemblance is exact [Armstrong] |
8539 | Universals are required to give a satisfactory account of the laws of nature [Armstrong] |
8529 | Deniers of properties and relations rely on either predicates or on classes [Armstrong] |
8532 | Resemblances must be in certain 'respects', and they seem awfully like properties [Armstrong] |
8530 | Change of temperature in objects is quite independent of the predicates 'hot' and 'cold' [Armstrong] |
8536 | We want to know what constituents of objects are grounds for the application of predicates [Armstrong] |
8531 | In most sets there is no property common to all the members [Armstrong] |
15753 | Essences might support Resemblance Nominalism, but they are too coarse and ill-defined [Armstrong] |
3756 | Perception, introspection, testimony, memory, reason, and inference can give us knowledge [Bernecker/Dretske] |
3757 | Causal theory says true perceptions must be caused by the object perceived [Bernecker/Dretske] |
3759 | You can acquire new knowledge by exploring memories [Bernecker/Dretske] |
3752 | Justification can be of the belief, or of the person holding the belief [Bernecker/Dretske] |
3753 | Foundationalism aims to avoid an infinite regress [Bernecker/Dretske] |
3754 | Infallible sensations can't be foundations if they are non-epistemic [Bernecker/Dretske] |
3755 | Justification is normative, so it can't be reduced to cognitive psychology [Bernecker/Dretske] |
3761 | Modern arguments against the sceptic are epistemological and semantic externalism, and the focus on relevance [Bernecker/Dretske] |
1556 | By nature people are close to one another, but culture drives them apart [Hippias] |
3760 | Predictions are bound to be arbitrary if they depend on the language used [Bernecker/Dretske] |
3758 | Semantic externalism ties content to the world, reducing error [Bernecker/Dretske] |
8533 | Predicates need ontological correlates to ensure that they apply [Armstrong] |
4035 | There must be some explanation of why certain predicates are applicable to certain objects [Armstrong] |
8541 | Regularities theories are poor on causal connections, counterfactuals and probability [Armstrong] |
8540 | The introduction of sparse properties avoids the regularity theory's problem with 'grue' [Armstrong] |