16 ideas
| 13407 | All worthwhile philosophy is synthetic theorizing, evaluated by experience [Papineau] |
| 13409 | Our best theories may commit us to mathematical abstracta, but that doesn't justify the commitment [Papineau] |
| 3756 | Perception, introspection, testimony, memory, reason, and inference can give us knowledge [Bernecker/Dretske] |
| 13406 | A priori knowledge is analytic - the structure of our concepts - and hence unimportant [Papineau] |
| 3757 | Causal theory says true perceptions must be caused by the object perceived [Bernecker/Dretske] |
| 13408 | Intuition and thought-experiments embody substantial information about the world [Papineau] |
| 3759 | You can acquire new knowledge by exploring memories [Bernecker/Dretske] |
| 3752 | Justification can be of the belief, or of the person holding the belief [Bernecker/Dretske] |
| 3753 | Foundationalism aims to avoid an infinite regress [Bernecker/Dretske] |
| 3754 | Infallible sensations can't be foundations if they are non-epistemic [Bernecker/Dretske] |
| 3755 | Justification is normative, so it can't be reduced to cognitive psychology [Bernecker/Dretske] |
| 3761 | Modern arguments against the sceptic are epistemological and semantic externalism, and the focus on relevance [Bernecker/Dretske] |
| 1556 | By nature people are close to one another, but culture drives them apart [Hippias] |
| 3760 | Predictions are bound to be arbitrary if they depend on the language used [Bernecker/Dretske] |
| 3758 | Semantic externalism ties content to the world, reducing error [Bernecker/Dretske] |
| 13410 | Verificationism about concepts means you can't deny a theory, because you can't have the concept [Papineau] |