14 ideas
| 17954 | Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)? [Vetter] |
| 17953 | Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates [Vetter] |
| 17952 | Modal accounts make essence less mysterious, by basing them on the clearer necessity [Vetter] |
| 17959 | Metaphysical necessity is even more deeply empirical than Kripke has argued [Vetter] |
| 17955 | Possible worlds allow us to talk about degrees of possibility [Vetter] |
| 17957 | Maybe possibility is constituted by potentiality [Vetter] |
| 17958 | The apparently metaphysically possible may only be epistemically possible [Vetter] |
| 17956 | Closeness of worlds should be determined by the intrinsic nature of relevant objects [Vetter] |
| 1556 | By nature people are close to one another, but culture drives them apart [Hippias] |
| 20180 | A happy and joyous life must largely be a quiet life [Russell] |
| 20177 | Boredom always involves not being fully occupied [Russell] |
| 20179 | Happiness involves enduring boredom, and the young should be taught this [Russell] |
| 20176 | Boredom is an increasingly strong motivating power [Russell] |
| 20178 | Life is now more interesting, but boredom is more frightening [Russell] |