16 ideas
| 8378 | Philosophers usually learn science from each other, not from science [Russell] |
| 15127 | A categorical basis could hardly explain a disposition if it had no powers of its own [Hawthorne] |
| 15124 | If properties are more than their powers, we could have two properties with the same power [Hawthorne] |
| 15123 | Is the causal profile of a property its essence? [Hawthorne] |
| 15122 | Could two different properties have the same causal profile? [Hawthorne] |
| 15128 | We can treat the structure/form of the world differently from the nodes/matter of the world [Hawthorne] |
| 15121 | An individual essence is a necessary and sufficient profile for a thing [Hawthorne] |
| 8375 | 'Necessary' is a predicate of a propositional function, saying it is true for all values of its argument [Russell] |
| 1556 | By nature people are close to one another, but culture drives them apart [Hippias] |
| 15126 | Maybe scientific causation is just generalisation about the patterns [Hawthorne] |
| 4396 | The law of causality is a source of confusion, and should be dropped from philosophy [Russell] |
| 8376 | If causes are contiguous with events, only the last bit is relevant, or the event's timing is baffling [Russell] |
| 8380 | Striking a match causes its igniting, even if it sometimes doesn't work [Russell] |
| 8379 | In causal laws, 'events' must recur, so they have to be universals, not particulars [Russell] |
| 15125 | We only know the mathematical laws, but not much else [Hawthorne] |
| 8381 | The constancy of scientific laws rests on differential equations, not on cause and effect [Russell] |