Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Intro to 'Creating the Kingdom of Ends'' and 'Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

20 ideas

3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
4901 Truth has to be correspondence to facts, and a match between relations of ideas and relations in the world [Perry]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
4885 Identity is a very weak relation, which doesn't require interdefinability, or shared properties [Perry]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
4899 Possible worlds thinking has clarified the logic of modality, but is problematic in epistemology [Perry]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
4898 Possible worlds are indices for a language, or concrete realities, or abstract possibilities [Perry]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 2. Knowledge as Convention
1556 By nature people are close to one another, but culture drives them apart [Hippias]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
4887 We try to cause other things to occur by causing mental events to occur [Perry]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
4884 Brain states must be in my head, and yet the pain seems to be in my hand [Perry]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
4888 It seems plausible that many animals have experiences without knowing about them [Perry]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
9757 A person viewed as an agent makes no sense without its own future [Korsgaard]
9758 To make sense of personal identity, focus on agency rather than experience [Korsgaard]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
4891 If epiphenomenalism just says mental events are effects but not causes, it is consistent with physicalism [Perry]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
4900 Prior to Kripke, the mind-brain identity theory usually claimed that the identity was contingent [Perry]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
4892 If physicalists stick with identity (not supervenience), Martian pain will not be like ours [Perry]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
4889 Although we may classify ideas by content, we individuate them differently, as their content can change [Perry]
18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension
4896 The intension of an expression is a function from possible worlds to an appropriate extension [Perry]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / b. Propositions as possible worlds
4897 A proposition is a set of possible worlds for which its intension delivers truth [Perry]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
4890 A sharp analytic/synthetic line can rarely be drawn, but some concepts are central to thought [Perry]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
9759 Theory of action focuses on explanation and prediction; practical action on justification and choice [Korsgaard]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
9760 Self-concern may be a source of pain, or a lack of self-respect, or a failure of responsibility [Korsgaard]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
9761 Personal concern for one's own self widens out into concern for the impersonal [Korsgaard]