Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'talk', 'Nature and Observability of Causal Relations' and 'On Platonism in Mathematics'

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12 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
A correct definition is what can be substituted without loss of meaning [Ducasse]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Very few things in set theory remain valid in intuitionist mathematics [Bernays]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
Restricted Platonism is just an ideal projection of a domain of thought [Bernays]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Mathematical abstraction just goes in a different direction from logic [Bernays]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 2. Knowledge as Convention
By nature people are close to one another, but culture drives them apart [Hippias]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Causation is defined in terms of a single sequence, and constant conjunction is no part of it [Ducasse]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
We see what is in common between causes to assign names to them, not to perceive them [Ducasse]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
Causes are either sufficient, or necessary, or necessitated, or contingent upon [Ducasse]
When a brick and a canary-song hit a window, we ignore the canary if we are interested in the breakage [Ducasse]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
A cause is a change which occurs close to the effect and just before it [Ducasse]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
Recurrence is only relevant to the meaning of law, not to the meaning of cause [Ducasse]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
We are interested in generalising about causes and effects purely for practical purposes [Ducasse]