14 ideas
11970 | Logicians like their entities to exhibit a maximum degree of purity [Kaplan] |
11969 | Models nicely separate particulars from their clothing, and logicians often accept that metaphysically [Kaplan] |
11976 | Aristotelian essentialism says essences are not relative to specification [Lewis] |
11978 | Causal necessities hold in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature [Lewis] |
11971 | The simplest solution to transworld identification is to adopt bare particulars [Kaplan] |
11979 | It doesn't take the whole of a possible Humphrey to win the election [Lewis] |
16994 | Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart [Kripke on Lewis] |
11974 | Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do [Lewis] |
11975 | If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart [Lewis] |
11977 | Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts [Lewis] |
11973 | Unusual people may have no counterparts, or several [Kaplan] |
11972 | Essence is a transworld heir line, rather than a collection of properties [Kaplan] |
1556 | By nature people are close to one another, but culture drives them apart [Hippias] |
11967 | Sentences might have the same sense when logically equivalent - or never have the same sense [Kaplan] |