16 ideas
2510 | Traditionally philosophy is an a priori enquiry into general truths about reality [Katz] |
2516 | Most of philosophy begins where science leaves off [Katz] |
15527 | Defining terms either enables elimination, or shows that they don't require elimination [Lewis] |
2521 | 'Real' maths objects have no causal role, no determinate reference, and no abstract/concrete distinction [Katz] |
15530 | A logically determinate name names the same thing in every possible world [Lewis] |
2513 | We don't have a clear enough sense of meaning to pronounce some sentences meaningless or just analytic [Katz] |
2522 | Experience cannot teach us why maths and logic are necessary [Katz] |
1556 | By nature people are close to one another, but culture drives them apart [Hippias] |
15526 | There is a method for defining new scientific terms just using the terms we already understand [Lewis] |
15528 | A Ramsey sentence just asserts that a theory can be realised, without saying by what [Lewis] |
15531 | The Ramsey sentence of a theory says that it has at least one realisation [Lewis] |
15529 | It is better to have one realisation of a theory than many - but it may not always be possible [Lewis] |
2517 | Structuralists see meaning behaviouristically, and Chomsky says nothing about it [Katz] |
2519 | It is generally accepted that sense is defined as the determiner of reference [Katz] |
2520 | Sense determines meaning and synonymy, not referential properties like denotation and truth [Katz] |
2518 | Sentences are abstract types (like musical scores), not individual tokens [Katz] |