13 ideas
| 15527 | Defining terms either enables elimination, or shows that they don't require elimination [Lewis] |
| 18889 | Ostensive definitions needn't involve pointing, but must refer to something specific [Salmon,N] |
| 14627 | S4, and therefore S5, are invalid for metaphysical modality [Salmon,N, by Williamson] |
| 18888 | Essentialism says some properties must be possessed, if a thing is to exist [Salmon,N] |
| 15530 | A logically determinate name names the same thing in every possible world [Lewis] |
| 1556 | By nature people are close to one another, but culture drives them apart [Hippias] |
| 15531 | The Ramsey sentence of a theory says that it has at least one realisation [Lewis] |
| 15528 | A Ramsey sentence just asserts that a theory can be realised, without saying by what [Lewis] |
| 15526 | There is a method for defining new scientific terms just using the terms we already understand [Lewis] |
| 15529 | It is better to have one realisation of a theory than many - but it may not always be possible [Lewis] |
| 18886 | Frege's 'sense' solves four tricky puzzles [Salmon,N] |
| 18887 | The perfect case of direct reference is a variable which has been assigned a value [Salmon,N] |
| 18891 | Nothing in the direct theory of reference blocks anti-essentialism; water structure might have been different [Salmon,N] |