Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'First Things First' and 'On Carnap's Views on Ontology'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


9 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
Quine rejects Carnap's view that science and philosophy are distinct [Quine, by Boulter]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
Names have no ontological commitment, because we can deny that they name anything [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
We can use quantification for commitment to unnameable things like the real numbers [Quine]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism
Evidentialism is not axiomatic; the evidence itself inclines us towards evidentialism [Conee]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
If pure guesses were reliable, reliabilists would have to endorse them [Conee]
More than actual reliability is needed, since I may mistakenly doubt what is reliable [Conee]
Reliabilism is poor on reflective judgements about hypothetical cases [Conee]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 2. Knowledge as Convention
By nature people are close to one another, but culture drives them apart [Hippias]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
Without the analytic/synthetic distinction, Carnap's ontology/empirical distinction collapses [Quine]