Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'talk', 'Causality and Determinism' and 'Events'

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14 ideas

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
Events have inbuilt essences, as necessary conditions for their occurrence [Lewis]
Some events involve no change; they must, because causal histories involve unchanges [Lewis]
Events are classes, and so there is a mereology of their parts [Lewis]
The events that suit semantics may not be the events that suit causation [Lewis]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
An event is a property of a unique space-time region [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
Properties are very abundant (unlike universals), and are used for semantics and higher-order variables [Lewis]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 2. Knowledge as Convention
By nature people are close to one another, but culture drives them apart [Hippias]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 3. Constraints on the will
Freedom involves acting according to an idea [Anscombe]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
To believe in determinism, one must believe in a system which determines events [Anscombe]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Causation is a general relation derived from instances of causal dependence [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
With diseases we easily trace a cause from an effect, but we cannot predict effects [Anscombe]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 6. Causation as primitive
The word 'cause' is an abstraction from a group of causal terms in a language (scrape, push..) [Anscombe]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Causation is relative to how we describe the primary relata [Anscombe, by Schaffer,J]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
Since Mill causation has usually been explained by necessary and sufficient conditions [Anscombe]