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All the ideas for 'talk', 'The Thought: a Logical Enquiry' and 'Truth by Convention'

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24 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
8996 If if time is money then if time is not money then time is money then if if if time is not money... [Quine]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
7740 There exists a realm, beyond objects and ideas, of non-spatio-temporal thoughts [Frege, by Weiner]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 7. Contextual Definition
8995 Definition by words is determinate but relative; fixing contexts could make it absolute [Quine]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
19466 The word 'true' seems to be unique and indefinable [Frege]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
19465 There cannot be complete correspondence, because ideas and reality are quite different [Frege]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
19468 The property of truth in 'It is true that I smell violets' adds nothing to 'I smell violets' [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
10064 Quine quickly dismisses If-thenism [Quine, by Musgrave]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 4. Logic by Convention
20296 Logic needs general conventions, but that needs logic to apply them to individual cases [Quine, by Rey]
8998 Claims that logic and mathematics are conventional are either empty, uninteresting, or false [Quine]
8999 Logic isn't conventional, because logic is needed to infer logic from conventions [Quine]
9000 If a convention cannot be communicated until after its adoption, what is its role? [Quine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
8994 If analytic geometry identifies figures with arithmetical relations, logicism can include geometry [Quine]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
8997 There are four different possible conventional accounts of geometry [Quine]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
8993 If mathematics follows from definitions, then it is conventional, and part of logic [Quine]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
19470 Thoughts in the 'third realm' cannot be sensed, and do not need an owner to exist [Frege]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / c. Facts and truths
19471 A fact is a thought that is true [Frege]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
9877 Late Frege saw his non-actual objective objects as exclusively thoughts and senses [Frege, by Dummett]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 2. Knowledge as Convention
1556 By nature people are close to one another, but culture drives them apart [Hippias]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
19469 We grasp thoughts (thinking), decide they are true (judgement), and manifest the judgement (assertion) [Frege]
8162 Thoughts have their own realm of reality - 'sense' (as opposed to the realm of 'reference') [Frege, by Dummett]
9818 A thought is distinguished from other things by a capacity to be true or false [Frege, by Dummett]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought
16379 Thoughts about myself are understood one way to me, and another when communicated [Frege]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
19467 A 'thought' is something for which the question of truth can arise; thoughts are senses of sentences [Frege]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 5. Unity of Propositions
19472 A sentence is only a thought if it is complete, and has a time-specification [Frege]