10 ideas
10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
7332 | There is a huge range of sentences of which we do not know the logical form [Davidson] |
10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
1556 | By nature people are close to one another, but culture drives them apart [Hippias] |
10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |
7772 | Compositionality explains how long sentences work, and truth conditions are the main compositional feature [Davidson, by Lycan] |
7327 | Davidson thinks Frege lacks an account of how words create sentence-meaning [Davidson, by Miller,A] |
7769 | You can state truth-conditions for "I am sick now" by relativising it to a speaker at a time [Davidson, by Lycan] |
6179 | Should we assume translation to define truth, or the other way around? [Blackburn on Davidson] |