16 ideas
| 2510 | Traditionally philosophy is an a priori enquiry into general truths about reality [Katz] |
| 2516 | Most of philosophy begins where science leaves off [Katz] |
| 10429 | It is best to say that a name designates iff there is something for it to designate [Sainsbury] |
| 10425 | Definite descriptions may not be referring expressions, since they can fail to refer [Sainsbury] |
| 10438 | Definite descriptions are usually rigid in subject, but not in predicate, position [Sainsbury] |
| 2521 | 'Real' maths objects have no causal role, no determinate reference, and no abstract/concrete distinction [Katz] |
| 2513 | We don't have a clear enough sense of meaning to pronounce some sentences meaningless or just analytic [Katz] |
| 2522 | Experience cannot teach us why maths and logic are necessary [Katz] |
| 1556 | By nature people are close to one another, but culture drives them apart [Hippias] |
| 2517 | Structuralists see meaning behaviouristically, and Chomsky says nothing about it [Katz] |
| 10432 | A new usage of a name could arise from a mistaken baptism of nothing [Sainsbury] |
| 2519 | It is generally accepted that sense is defined as the determiner of reference [Katz] |
| 10434 | Even a quantifier like 'someone' can be used referentially [Sainsbury] |
| 2520 | Sense determines meaning and synonymy, not referential properties like denotation and truth [Katz] |
| 2518 | Sentences are abstract types (like musical scores), not individual tokens [Katz] |
| 10431 | Things are thought to have a function, even when they can't perform them [Sainsbury] |