43 ideas
23247 | The need to act produces consciousness, and practical reason is the root of all reason [Fichte] |
23232 | Sufficient reason makes the transition from the particular to the general [Fichte] |
23227 | Each object has a precise number of properties, each to a precise degree [Fichte] |
23228 | The principle of activity and generation is found in a self-moving basic force [Fichte] |
11897 | A principle of individuation may pinpoint identity and distinctness, now and over time [Mackie,P] |
11898 | Individuation may include counterfactual possibilities, as well as identity and persistence [Mackie,P] |
11883 | A haecceity is the essential, simple, unanalysable property of being-this-thing [Mackie,P] |
11889 | Essentialism must avoid both reduplication of essences, and multiple occupancy by essences [Mackie,P] |
11877 | An individual essence is the properties the object could not exist without [Mackie,P] |
11882 | No other object can possibly have the same individual essence as some object [Mackie,P] |
11886 | There are problems both with individual essences and without them [Mackie,P] |
11909 | Unlike Hesperus=Phosophorus, water=H2O needs further premisses before it is necessary [Mackie,P] |
11899 | Why are any sortals essential, and why are only some of them essential? [Mackie,P] |
11906 | The Kripke and Putnam view of kinds makes them explanatorily basic, but has modal implications [Mackie,P] |
11894 | Origin is not a necessity, it is just 'tenacious'; we keep it fixed in counterfactual discussions [Mackie,P] |
11887 | Transworld identity without individual essences leads to 'bare identities' [Mackie,P] |
11890 | De re modality without bare identities or individual essence needs counterparts [Mackie,P] |
11892 | Things may only be counterparts under some particular relation [Mackie,P] |
11893 | Possibilities for Caesar must be based on some phase of the real Caesar [Mackie,P] |
11884 | The theory of 'haecceitism' does not need commitment to individual haecceities [Mackie,P] |
23241 | I am myself, but not the external object; so I only sense myself, and not the object [Fichte] |
21969 | Awareness of reality comes from the free activity of consciousness [Fichte] |
21966 | Self-consciousness is the basis of knowledge, and knowing something is knowing myself [Fichte] |
21967 | There is nothing to say about anything which is outside my consciousness [Fichte] |
23231 | I immediately know myself, and anything beyond that is an inference [Fichte] |
23246 | Faith is not knowledge; it is a decision of the will [Fichte] |
23245 | Knowledge can't be its own foundation; there has to be regress of higher and higher authorities [Fichte] |
1556 | By nature people are close to one another, but culture drives them apart [Hippias] |
11905 | Locke's kind essences are explanatory, without being necessary to the kind [Mackie,P] |
23242 | Consciousness has two parts, passively receiving sensation, and actively causing productions [Fichte] |
23240 | We can't know by sight or hearing without realising that we are doing so [Fichte] |
23243 | Consciousness of external things is always accompanied by an unnoticed consciousness of self [Fichte] |
23244 | Forming purposes is absolutely free, and produces something from nothing [Fichte] |
23237 | The capacity for freedom is above the laws of nature, with its own power of purpose and will [Fichte] |
23235 | I want independent control of the fundamental cause of my decisions [Fichte] |
23230 | Nature contains a fundamental force of thought [Fichte] |
23233 | The will is awareness of one of our inner natural forces [Fichte] |
23234 | I cannot change the nature which has been determined for me [Fichte] |
23239 | The self is, apart from outward behaviour, a drive in your nature [Fichte] |
23238 | If life lacks love it becomes destruction [Fichte] |
23236 | Freedom means making yourself become true to your essential nature [Fichte] |
23229 | Nature is wholly interconnected, and the tiniest change affects everything [Fichte] |
11907 | Maybe the identity of kinds is necessary, but instances being of that kind is not [Mackie,P] |