Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Conceptual truth and metaphysical necessity' and 'Essence, Necessity and Explanation'

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18 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
15118 A successful Aristotelian 'definition' is what sciences produces after an investigation [Koslicki]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
15116 Essences cause necessary features, and definitions describe those necessary features [Koslicki]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
15110 An essence and what merely follow from it are distinct [Koslicki]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
15113 Individuals are perceived, but demonstration and definition require universals [Koslicki]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
15112 If an object exists, then its essential properties are necessary [Koslicki]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
16422 The necessity of a proposition concerns reality, not our words or concepts [Stalnaker]
16423 Conceptual possibilities are metaphysical possibilities we can conceive of [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
16421 Critics say there are just an a priori necessary part, and an a posteriori contingent part [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
16429 A 'centred' world is an ordered triple of world, individual and time [Stalnaker]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 2. Knowledge as Convention
1556 By nature people are close to one another, but culture drives them apart [Hippias]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration
15111 In demonstration, the explanatory order must mirror the causal order of the phenomena [Koslicki]
15115 In a demonstration the middle term explains, by being part of the definition [Koslicki]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
15117 Greek uses the same word for 'cause' and 'explanation' [Koslicki]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
15114 Discovering the Aristotelian essence of thunder will tell us why thunder occurs [Koslicki]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
16428 Meanings aren't in the head, but that is because they are abstract [Stalnaker]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
16432 One view says the causal story is built into the description that is the name's content [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
16430 Two-D says that a posteriori is primary and contingent, and the necessity is the secondary intension [Stalnaker]
16431 In one view, the secondary intension is metasemantic, about how the thinker relates to the content [Stalnaker]