43 ideas
| 22309 | An idea can only be like another idea [Berkeley] |
| 6717 | Abstract ideas are impossible [Berkeley] |
| 18876 | Berkeley does believe in trees, but is confused about what trees are [Berkeley, by Cameron] |
| 6715 | Universals do not have single meaning, but attach to many different particulars [Berkeley] |
| 6719 | No one will think of abstractions if they only have particular ideas [Berkeley] |
| 6714 | Universals do not have any intrinsic properties, but only relations to particulars [Berkeley] |
| 6729 | Material substance is just general existence which can have properties [Berkeley] |
| 16636 | A die has no distinct subject, but is merely a name for its modes or accidents [Berkeley] |
| 11181 | Aristotelian essentialism involves a 'natural' or 'causal' interpretation of modal operators [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 11184 | Aristotelian essentialism is about shared properties, individuating essentialism about distinctive properties [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 11180 | Essentialist sentences are not theorems of modal logic, and can even be false [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 11186 | 'Essentially' won't replace 'necessarily' for vacuous properties like snub-nosed or self-identical [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 11185 | 'Is essentially' has a different meaning from 'is necessarily', as they often cannot be substituted [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 11182 | If essences are objects with only essential properties, they are elusive in possible worlds [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 11183 | The use of possible worlds is to sort properties (not to individuate objects) [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 11187 | In possible worlds, names are just neutral unvarying pegs for truths and predicates [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 6722 | Perception is existence for my table, but also possible perception, by me or a spirit [Berkeley] |
| 6723 | The 'esse' of objects is 'percipi', and they can only exist in minds [Berkeley] |
| 6732 | When I shut my eyes, the things I saw may still exist, but in another mind [Berkeley] |
| 6724 | The only substance is spirit, or that which perceives [Berkeley] |
| 6726 | No one can, by abstraction, conceive extension and motion of bodies without sensible qualities [Berkeley] |
| 6728 | Motion is in the mind, since swifter ideas produce an appearance of slower motion [Berkeley] |
| 6727 | Figure and extension seem just as dependent on the observer as heat and cold [Berkeley] |
| 6495 | Berkeley's idealism resulted from fear of scepticism in representative realism [Robinson,H on Berkeley] |
| 6720 | Knowledge is of ideas from senses, or ideas of the mind, or operations on sensations [Berkeley] |
| 1556 | By nature people are close to one another, but culture drives them apart [Hippias] |
| 23636 | Berkeley's idealism gives no grounds for believing in other minds [Reid on Berkeley] |
| 6736 | I know other minds by ideas which are referred by me to other agents, as their effects [Berkeley] |
| 6713 | If animals have ideas, and are not machines, they must have some reason [Berkeley] |
| 6491 | Berkeley replaced intentionality with an anti-abstractionist imagist theory of thought [Berkeley, by Robinson,H] |
| 6711 | The mind creates abstract ideas by considering qualities separated from their objects [Berkeley] |
| 10581 | I can only combine particulars in imagination; I can't create 'abstract' ideas [Berkeley] |
| 6721 | Ideas are perceived by the mind, soul or self [Berkeley] |
| 6716 | Language is presumably for communication, and names stand for ideas [Berkeley] |
| 6718 | I can't really go wrong if I stick to wordless thought [Berkeley] |
| 6731 | No one can explain how matter affects mind, so matter is redundant in philosophy [Berkeley] |
| 6730 | We discover natural behaviour by observing settled laws of nature, not necessary connections [Berkeley] |
| 15861 | The laws of nature are mental regularities which we learn by experience [Berkeley] |
| 11189 | Dispositional essences are special, as if an object loses them they cease to exist [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 6734 | If properties and qualities arise from an inward essence, we will remain ignorant of nature [Berkeley] |
| 6735 | All motion is relative, so a single body cannot move [Berkeley] |
| 6733 | I cannot imagine time apart from the flow of ideas in my mind [Berkeley] |
| 6737 | Particular evils are really good when linked to the whole system of beings [Berkeley] |