11 ideas
| 15335 | Peirce's theory offers anti-realist verificationism, but surely how things are is independent of us? [Horsten on Peirce] |
| 14796 | Independent truth (if there is any) is the ultimate result of sufficient enquiry [Peirce] |
| 19718 | Indefeasibility does not imply infallibility [Grundmann] |
| 14795 | Pragmatism is a way of establishing meanings, not a theory of metaphysics or a set of truths [Peirce] |
| 19717 | Can a defeater itself be defeated? [Grundmann] |
| 19716 | Simple reliabilism can't cope with defeaters of reliably produced beliefs [Grundmann] |
| 19715 | You can 'rebut' previous beliefs, 'undercut' the power of evidence, or 'reason-defeat' the truth [Grundmann] |
| 19713 | Defeasibility theory needs to exclude defeaters which are true but misleading [Grundmann] |
| 19714 | Knowledge requires that there are no facts which would defeat its justification [Grundmann] |
| 19719 | 'Moderate' foundationalism has basic justification which is defeasible [Grundmann] |
| 1556 | By nature people are close to one another, but culture drives them apart [Hippias] |