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All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'De Corpore (Elements, First Section)' and 'Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy'

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95 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
Definitions are the first step in philosophy [Hobbes]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
'Socrates is human' expresses predication, and 'Socrates is a man' expresses identity [Russell]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
Definitions of things that are caused must express their manner of generation [Hobbes]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 3. Types of Definition
A definition by 'extension' enumerates items, and one by 'intension' gives a defining property [Russell]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia
Definition is resolution of names into successive genera, and finally the difference [Hobbes]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 8. Impredicative Definition
A defined name should not appear in the definition [Hobbes]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 3. Question Begging
'Petitio principii' is reusing the idea to be defined, in disguised words [Hobbes]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / a. Category mistakes
The sentence 'procrastination drinks quadruplicity' is meaningless, rather than false [Russell, by Orenstein]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
An argument 'satisfies' a function φx if φa is true [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
The Darapti syllogism is fallacious: All M is S, all M is P, so some S is P' - but if there is no M? [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / d. Infinite Sets
We can enumerate finite classes, but an intensional definition is needed for infinite classes [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / b. Axiom of Extensionality I
Members define a unique class, whereas defining characteristics are numerous [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / f. Axiom of Infinity V
Infinity says 'for any inductive cardinal, there is a class having that many terms' [Russell]
We may assume that there are infinite collections, as there is no logical reason against them [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
The British parliament has one representative selected from each constituency [Russell]
Choice shows that if any two cardinals are not equal, one must be the greater [Russell]
Choice is equivalent to the proposition that every class is well-ordered [Russell]
We can pick all the right or left boots, but socks need Choice to insure the representative class [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / p. Axiom of Reducibility
Reducibility: a family of functions is equivalent to a single type of function [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / c. Logical sets
Propositions about classes can be reduced to propositions about their defining functions [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 7. Natural Sets
Russell's proposal was that only meaningful predicates have sets as their extensions [Russell, by Orenstein]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Classes are logical fictions, and are not part of the ultimate furniture of the world [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 3. Axioms of Mereology
A part of a part is a part of a whole [Hobbes]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
All the propositions of logic are completely general [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 8. Logic of Mathematics
In modern times, logic has become mathematical, and mathematics has become logical [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
Logic can only assert hypothetical existence [Russell]
Logic is concerned with the real world just as truly as zoology [Russell]
Logic can be known a priori, without study of the actual world [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Asking 'Did Homer exist?' is employing an abbreviated description [Russell]
Russell admitted that even names could also be used as descriptions [Russell, by Bach]
Names are really descriptions, except for a few words like 'this' and 'that' [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / f. Names eliminated
The only genuine proper names are 'this' and 'that' [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions
'I met a unicorn' is meaningful, and so is 'unicorn', but 'a unicorn' is not [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
If straight lines were like ratios they might intersect at a 'gap', and have no point in common [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
New numbers solve problems: negatives for subtraction, fractions for division, complex for equations [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / c. Priority of numbers
Could a number just be something which occurs in a progression? [Russell, by Hart,WD]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
If we just say one, one, one, one, we don't know where we have got to [Hobbes]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / i. Reals from cuts
A series can be 'Cut' in two, where the lower class has no maximum, the upper no minimum [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / j. Complex numbers
A complex number is simply an ordered couple of real numbers [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / m. One
Discovering that 1 is a number was difficult [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
Numbers are needed for counting, so they need a meaning, and not just formal properties [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / f. Arithmetic
The formal laws of arithmetic are the Commutative, the Associative and the Distributive [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
Infinity and continuity used to be philosophy, but are now mathematics [Russell]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
The definition of order needs a transitive relation, to leap over infinite intermediate terms [Russell]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
Any founded, non-repeating series all reachable in steps will satisfy Peano's axioms [Russell]
'0', 'number' and 'successor' cannot be defined by Peano's axioms [Russell]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / d. Hume's Principle
A number is something which characterises collections of the same size [Russell]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
What matters is the logical interrelation of mathematical terms, not their intrinsic nature [Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 5. Numbers as Adjectival
Maybe numbers are adjectives, since 'ten men' grammatically resembles 'white men' [Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
For Russell, numbers are sets of equivalent sets [Russell, by Benacerraf]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / e. Psychologism
There is always something psychological about inference [Russell]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
Existence can only be asserted of something described, not of something named [Russell]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
Change is nothing but movement [Hobbes]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Fictionalism
Classes are logical fictions, made from defining characteristics [Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation
If a relation is symmetrical and transitive, it has to be reflexive [Russell]
'Asymmetry' is incompatible with its converse; a is husband of b, so b can't be husband of a [Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
Accidents are just modes of thinking about bodies [Hobbes]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
Accidents are not parts of bodies (like blood in a cloth); they have accidents as things have a size [Hobbes]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
The complete power of an event is just the aggregate of the qualities that produced it [Hobbes]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
The only generalities or universals are names or signs [Hobbes]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / c. Individuation by location
Bodies are independent of thought, and coincide with part of space [Hobbes]
If you separate the two places of one thing, you will also separate the thing [Hobbes]
If you separated two things in the same place, you would also separate the places [Hobbes]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
If a whole body is moved, its parts must move with it [Hobbes]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
A body is always the same, whether the parts are together or dispersed [Hobbes]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
To make a whole, parts needn't be put together, but can be united in the mind [Hobbes]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
The essence of individuality is beyond description, and hence irrelevant to science [Russell]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Particulars contain universal things [Hobbes]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
Some accidental features are permanent, unless the object perishes [Hobbes]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
The feature which picks out or names a thing is usually called its 'essence' [Hobbes]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 8. Continuity of Rivers
It is the same river if it has the same source, no matter what flows in it [Hobbes]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
Some individuate the ship by unity of matter, and others by unity of form [Hobbes]
If a new ship were made of the discarded planks, would two ships be numerically the same? [Hobbes]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
As an infant, Socrates was not the same body, but he was the same human being [Hobbes]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
Two bodies differ when (at some time) you can say something of one you can't say of the other [Hobbes]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
Inferring q from p only needs p to be true, and 'not-p or q' to be true [Russell]
All forms of implication are expressible as truth-functions [Russell]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
We can imagine a point swelling and contracting - but not how this could be done [Hobbes]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
If something is true in all possible worlds then it is logically necessary [Russell]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 2. Knowledge as Convention
By nature people are close to one another, but culture drives them apart [Hippias]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Mathematically expressed propositions are true of the world, but how to interpret them? [Russell]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
Science aims to show causes and generation of things [Hobbes]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
Imagination is just weakened sensation [Hobbes]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 10. Conatus/Striving
A 'conatus' is an initial motion, experienced by us as desire or aversion [Hobbes, by Arthur,R]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Sensation is merely internal motion of the sentient being [Hobbes]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / e. Basic emotions
Apart from pleasure and pain, the only emotions are appetite and aversion [Hobbes]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
Words are not for communication, but as marks for remembering what we have learned [Hobbes]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Propositions are mainly verbal expressions of true or false, and perhaps also symbolic thoughts [Russell]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / b. Prime matter
Prime matter is body considered with mere size and extension, and potential [Hobbes]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Acting on a body is either creating or destroying a property in it [Hobbes]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
An effect needs a sufficient and necessary cause [Hobbes]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
A cause is the complete sum of the features which necessitate the effect [Hobbes]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
Motion is losing one place and acquiring another [Hobbes]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
'Force' is the quantity of movement imposed on something [Hobbes]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / k. Temporal truths
Past times can't exist anywhere, apart from in our memories [Hobbes]