12 ideas
| 8349 | The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson] |
| 8956 | What is a singleton set, if a set is meant to be a collection of objects? [Szabó] |
| 8348 | If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson] |
| 8953 | Abstract entities don't depend on their concrete entities ...but maybe on the totality of concrete things [Szabó] |
| 1556 | By nature people are close to one another, but culture drives them apart [Hippias] |
| 8347 | Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson] |
| 8954 | Geometrical circles cannot identify a circular paint patch, presumably because they lack something [Szabó] |
| 8955 | Abstractions are imperceptible, non-causal, and non-spatiotemporal (the third explaining the others) [Szabó] |
| 10371 | Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
| 8403 | Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson] |
| 8346 | Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson] |
| 4778 | A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos] |