13 ideas
| 17311 | Real definitions don't just single out a thing; they must also explain its essence [Koslicki] |
| 8956 | What is a singleton set, if a set is meant to be a collection of objects? [Szabó] |
| 17312 | It is more explanatory if you show how a number is constructed from basic entities and relations [Koslicki] |
| 17314 | The relata of grounding are propositions or facts, but for dependence it is objects and their features [Koslicki] |
| 8953 | Abstract entities don't depend on their concrete entities ...but maybe on the totality of concrete things [Szabó] |
| 17313 | Modern views want essences just to individuate things across worlds and times [Koslicki] |
| 17309 | For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions [Koslicki] |
| 17315 | We need a less propositional view of essence, and so must distinguish it clearly from real definitions [Koslicki] |
| 1556 | By nature people are close to one another, but culture drives them apart [Hippias] |
| 17317 | A good explanation captures the real-world dependence among the phenomena [Koslicki] |
| 8954 | Geometrical circles cannot identify a circular paint patch, presumably because they lack something [Szabó] |
| 17316 | We can abstract to a dependent entity by blocking out features of its bearer [Koslicki] |
| 8955 | Abstractions are imperceptible, non-causal, and non-spatiotemporal (the third explaining the others) [Szabó] |