17 ideas
8956 | What is a singleton set, if a set is meant to be a collection of objects? [Szabó] |
8953 | Abstract entities don't depend on their concrete entities ...but maybe on the totality of concrete things [Szabó] |
1556 | By nature people are close to one another, but culture drives them apart [Hippias] |
23805 | Some explanations offer to explain a mystery by a greater mystery [Schulte] |
8954 | Geometrical circles cannot identify a circular paint patch, presumably because they lack something [Szabó] |
23792 | Phenomenal and representational character may have links, or even be united [Schulte] |
23795 | Naturalistic accounts of content cannot rely on primitive mental or normative notions [Schulte] |
23804 | Maybe we can explain mental content in terms of phenomenal properties [Schulte] |
23806 | Naturalist accounts of representation must match the views of cognitive science [Schulte] |
23793 | On the whole, referential content is seen as broad, and sense content as narrow [Schulte] |
23796 | Naturalists must explain both representation, and what is represented [Schulte] |
23802 | Conceptual role semantics says content is determined by cognitive role [Schulte] |
23797 | Cause won't explain content, because one cause can produce several contents [Schulte] |
23799 | Teleosemantics explains content in terms of successful and unsuccessful functioning [Schulte] |
23800 | Teleosemantic explanations say content is the causal result of naturally selected functions [Schulte] |
23798 | Information theories say content is information, such as smoke making fire probable [Schulte] |
8955 | Abstractions are imperceptible, non-causal, and non-spatiotemporal (the third explaining the others) [Szabó] |