Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Nominalism' and 'Conceptual truth and metaphysical necessity'

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13 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / c. Unit (Singleton) Sets
What is a singleton set, if a set is meant to be a collection of objects? [Szabó]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
Abstract entities don't depend on their concrete entities ...but maybe on the totality of concrete things [Szabó]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
The necessity of a proposition concerns reality, not our words or concepts [Stalnaker]
Conceptual possibilities are metaphysical possibilities we can conceive of [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
Critics say there are just an a priori necessary part, and an a posteriori contingent part [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
A 'centred' world is an ordered triple of world, individual and time [Stalnaker]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 2. Knowledge as Convention
By nature people are close to one another, but culture drives them apart [Hippias]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
Geometrical circles cannot identify a circular paint patch, presumably because they lack something [Szabó]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Meanings aren't in the head, but that is because they are abstract [Stalnaker]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 5. Abstracta by Negation
Abstractions are imperceptible, non-causal, and non-spatiotemporal (the third explaining the others) [Szabó]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
One view says the causal story is built into the description that is the name's content [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
Two-D says that a posteriori is primary and contingent, and the necessity is the secondary intension [Stalnaker]
In one view, the secondary intension is metasemantic, about how the thinker relates to the content [Stalnaker]