73 ideas
4194 | Metaphysics is concerned with the fundamental structure of reality as a whole [Lowe] |
4214 | Maybe such concepts as causation, identity and existence are primitive and irreducible [Lowe] |
10308 | Questions about objects are questions about certain non-vacuous singular terms [Hale] |
4222 | If all that exists is what is being measured, what about the people and instruments doing the measuring? [Lowe] |
4217 | It is more extravagant, in general, to revise one's logic than to augment one's ontology [Lowe] |
10314 | An expression is a genuine singular term if it resists elimination by paraphrase [Hale] |
10316 | We should decide whether singular terms are genuine by their usage [Hale] |
10312 | Often the same singular term does not ensure reliable inference [Hale] |
10313 | Plenty of clear examples have singular terms with no ontological commitment [Hale] |
10322 | If singular terms can't be language-neutral, then we face a relativity about their objects [Hale] |
4229 | An infinite series of tasks can't be completed because it has no last member [Lowe] |
4240 | It might be argued that mathematics does not, or should not, aim at truth [Lowe] |
4241 | If there are infinite numbers and finite concrete objects, this implies that numbers are abstract objects [Lowe] |
4239 | Nominalists deny abstract objects, because we can have no reason to believe in their existence [Lowe] |
4202 | Change can be of composition (the component parts), or quality (properties), or substance [Lowe] |
4201 | Four theories of qualitative change are 'a is F now', or 'a is F-at-t', or 'a-at-t is F', or 'a is-at-t F' [Lowe, by PG] |
4219 | Numerically distinct events of the same kind (like two battles) can coincide in space and time [Lowe] |
4221 | Maybe modern physics requires an event-ontology, rather than a thing-ontology [Lowe] |
4220 | Maybe an event is the exemplification of a property at a time [Lowe] |
4225 | Events are changes in the properties of or relations between things [Lowe] |
10512 | The abstract/concrete distinction is based on what is perceivable, causal and located [Hale] |
10517 | Colours and points seem to be both concrete and abstract [Hale] |
10519 | The abstract/concrete distinction is in the relations in the identity-criteria of object-names [Hale] |
10520 | Token-letters and token-words are concrete objects, type-letters and type-words abstract [Hale] |
10524 | There is a hierarchy of abstraction, based on steps taken by equivalence relations [Hale] |
4196 | The main categories of existence are either universal and particular, or abstract and concrete [Lowe] |
4234 | Trope theory says blueness is a real feature of objects, but not the same as an identical blue found elsewhere [Lowe] |
4235 | Maybe a cushion is just a bundle of tropes, such as roundness, blueness and softness [Lowe] |
4236 | Tropes seem to be abstract entities, because they can't exist alone, but must come in bundles [Lowe] |
4197 | The category of universals can be sub-divided into properties and relations [Lowe] |
10521 | If F can't have location, there is no problem of things having F in different locations [Hale] |
10511 | It is doubtful if one entity, a universal, can be picked out by both predicates and abstract nouns [Hale] |
10318 | Realists take universals to be the referrents of both adjectives and of nouns [Hale] |
4232 | Nominalists believe that only particulars exist [Lowe] |
10310 | Objections to Frege: abstracta are unknowable, non-independent, unstatable, unindividuated [Hale] |
4205 | 'Is non-self-exemplifying' is a predicate which cannot denote a property (as it would be a contradiction) [Lowe] |
4233 | If 'blueness' is a set of particulars, there is danger of circularity, or using universals, in identifying the set [Lowe] |
10518 | Shapes and directions are of something, but games and musical compositions are not [Hale] |
10513 | Many abstract objects, such as chess, seem non-spatial, but are not atemporal [Hale] |
10514 | If the mental is non-spatial but temporal, then it must be classified as abstract [Hale] |
10523 | Being abstract is based on a relation between things which are spatially separated [Hale] |
10307 | The modern Fregean use of the term 'object' is much broader than the ordinary usage [Hale] |
10315 | We can't believe in a 'whereabouts' because we ask 'what kind of object is it?' [Hale] |
4206 | Conventionalists see the world as an amorphous lump without identities, but are we part of the lump? [Lowe] |
4204 | Statues can't survive much change to their shape, unlike lumps of bronze, which must retain material [Lowe] |
4198 | If 5% replacement preserves a ship, we can replace 4% and 4% again, and still retain the ship [Lowe] |
4199 | A renovation or a reconstruction of an original ship would be accepted, as long as the other one didn't exist [Lowe] |
4200 | If old parts are stored and then appropriated, they are no longer part of the original (which is the renovated ship). [Lowe] |
10522 | The relations featured in criteria of identity are always equivalence relations [Hale] |
10321 | We sometimes apply identity without having a real criterion [Hale] |
4203 | Identity of Indiscernibles (same properties, same thing) ) is not Leibniz's Law (same thing, same properties) [Lowe] |
4195 | It is impossible to reach a valid false conclusion from true premises, so reason itself depends on possibility [Lowe] |
4207 | We might eliminate 'possible' and 'necessary' in favour of quantification over possible worlds [Lowe] |
4223 | Unfalsifiability may be a failure in an empirical theory, but it is a virtue in metaphysics [Lowe] |
4193 | The behaviour of persons and social groups seems to need rational rather than causal explanation [Lowe] |
2170 | Homer does not distinguish between soul and body [Homer, by Williams,B] |
4238 | The centre of mass of the solar system is a non-causal abstract object, despite having a location [Lowe] |
4237 | Concrete and abstract objects are distinct because the former have causal powers and relations [Lowe] |
2171 | The 'will' doesn't exist; there is just conclusion, then action [Homer, by Williams,B] |
21819 | Plato says the Good produces the Intellectual-Principle, which in turn produces the Soul [Homer, by Plotinus] |
11388 | Let there be one ruler [Homer] |
4210 | If the concept of a cause says it precedes its effect, that rules out backward causation by definition [Lowe] |
4209 | The theories of fact causation and event causation are both worth serious consideration [Lowe] |
4215 | It seems proper to say that only substances (rather than events) have causal powers [Lowe] |
4211 | Causal overdetermination is either actual overdetermination, or pre-emption, or the fail-safe case [Lowe] |
4213 | Causation may be instances of laws (seen either as constant conjunctions, or as necessities) [Lowe] |
4212 | Hume showed that causation could at most be natural necessity, never metaphysical necessity [Lowe] |
14581 | The normative view says laws show the natural behaviour of natural kind members [Lowe, by Mumford/Anjum] |
4208 | 'If he wasn't born he wouldn't have died' doesn't mean birth causes death, so causation isn't counterfactual [Lowe] |
4224 | If motion is change of distance between objects, it involves no intrinsic change in the objects [Lowe] |
4227 | Surfaces, lines and points are not, strictly speaking, parts of space, but 'limits', which are abstract [Lowe] |
4228 | If space is entirely relational, what makes a boundary, or a place unoccupied by physical objects? [Lowe] |
14829 | Homer so enjoys the company of the gods that he must have been deeply irreligious [Homer, by Nietzsche] |