32 ideas
| 23728 | Analysis aims to express the full set of platitudes surrounding a given concept [Smith,M] |
| 23744 | Defining a set of things by paradigms doesn't pin them down enough [Smith,M] |
| 17499 | Theoretical models can represent, by mapping onto the data-models [Portides] |
| 17498 | In the 'received view' models are formal; the 'semantic view' emphasises representation [Portides, by PG] |
| 17501 | Representational success in models depends on success of their explanations [Portides] |
| 17502 | The best model of the atomic nucleus is the one which explains the most results [Portides] |
| 17496 | 'Model' belongs in a family of concepts, with representation, idealisation and abstraction [Portides] |
| 17497 | Models are theory-driven, or phenomenological (more empirical and specific) [Portides] |
| 17500 | General theories may be too abstract to actually explain the mechanisms [Portides] |
| 2170 | Homer does not distinguish between soul and body [Homer, by Williams,B] |
| 23743 | Capturing all the common sense facts about rationality is almost impossible [Smith,M] |
| 2171 | The 'will' doesn't exist; there is just conclusion, then action [Homer, by Williams,B] |
| 23724 | A pure desire could be criticised if it were based on a false belief [Smith,M] |
| 23736 | A person can have a desire without feeling it [Smith,M] |
| 23723 | In the Humean account, desires are not true/false, or subject to any rational criticism [Smith,M] |
| 23735 | Subjects may be fallible about the desires which explain their actions [Smith,M] |
| 23738 | Humeans (unlike their opponents) say that desires and judgements can separate [Smith,M] |
| 23742 | If first- and second-order desires conflict, harmony does not require the second-order to win [Smith,M] |
| 23746 | Objective reasons to act might be the systematic desires of a fully rational person [Smith,M] |
| 23739 | Goals need desires, and so only desires can motivate us [Smith,M] |
| 23733 | Motivating reasons are psychological, while normative reasons are external [Smith,M] |
| 23740 | Humeans take maximising desire satisfaction as the normative reasons for actions [Smith,M] |
| 23745 | We cannot expect even fully rational people to converge on having the same desires for action [Smith,M] |
| 23731 | 'Externalists' say moral judgements are not reasons, and maybe not even motives [Smith,M] |
| 23732 | A person could make a moral judgement without being in any way motivated by it [Smith,M] |
| 23729 | Moral internalism says a judgement of rightness is thereby motivating [Smith,M] |
| 23730 | 'Rationalism' says the rightness of an action is a reason to perform it [Smith,M] |
| 23727 | Expressivists count attitudes as 'moral' if they concern features of things, rather than their mere existence [Smith,M] |
| 23741 | Is valuing something a matter of believing or a matter of desiring? [Smith,M] |
| 21819 | Plato says the Good produces the Intellectual-Principle, which in turn produces the Soul [Homer, by Plotinus] |
| 11388 | Let there be one ruler [Homer] |
| 14829 | Homer so enjoys the company of the gods that he must have been deeply irreligious [Homer, by Nietzsche] |