Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mathematical Methods in Philosophy', 'Essence and Potentiality' and 'On the Infinite'

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27 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 9. Philosophical Logic
18739 Three stages of philosophical logic: syntactic (1905-55), possible worlds (1963-85), widening (1990-) [Horsten/Pettigrew]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
18741 Logical formalization makes concepts precise, and also shows their interrelation [Horsten/Pettigrew]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
18744 Models are sets with functions and relations, and truth built up from the components [Horsten/Pettigrew]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
12456 I aim to establish certainty for mathematical methods [Hilbert]
12461 We believe all mathematical problems are solvable [Hilbert]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
9633 No one shall drive us out of the paradise the Cantor has created for us [Hilbert]
12460 We extend finite statements with ideal ones, in order to preserve our logic [Hilbert]
12462 Only the finite can bring certainty to the infinite [Hilbert]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / d. Actual infinite
12455 The idea of an infinite totality is an illusion [Hilbert]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / j. Infinite divisibility
12457 There is no continuum in reality to realise the infinitely small [Hilbert]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
12459 The subject matter of mathematics is immediate and clear concrete symbols [Hilbert]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 8. Finitism
18112 Mathematics divides in two: meaningful finitary statements, and empty idealised statements [Hilbert]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
18740 If 'exist' doesn't express a property, we can hardly ask for its essence [Horsten/Pettigrew]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
17954 Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)? [Vetter]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
17953 Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates [Vetter]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
17952 Modal accounts make essence less mysterious, by basing them on the clearer necessity [Vetter]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
17959 Metaphysical necessity is even more deeply empirical than Kripke has argued [Vetter]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
17955 Possible worlds allow us to talk about degrees of possibility [Vetter]
17957 Maybe possibility is constituted by potentiality [Vetter]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable
17958 The apparently metaphysically possible may only be epistemically possible [Vetter]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
18745 A Tarskian model can be seen as a possible state of affairs [Horsten/Pettigrew]
18747 The 'spheres model' was added to possible worlds, to cope with counterfactuals [Horsten/Pettigrew]
17956 Closeness of worlds should be determined by the intrinsic nature of relevant objects [Vetter]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
18748 Epistemic logic introduced impossible worlds [Horsten/Pettigrew]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
18746 Possible worlds models contain sets of possible worlds; this is a large metaphysical commitment [Horsten/Pettigrew]
18750 Using possible worlds for knowledge and morality may be a step too far [Horsten/Pettigrew]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
9636 My theory aims at the certitude of mathematical methods [Hilbert]