Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mathematical Methods in Philosophy', 'Letters to Frege' and 'Abstract Objects'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


21 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 9. Philosophical Logic
Three stages of philosophical logic: syntactic (1905-55), possible worlds (1963-85), widening (1990-) [Horsten/Pettigrew]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Logical formalization makes concepts precise, and also shows their interrelation [Horsten/Pettigrew]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
Models are sets with functions and relations, and truth built up from the components [Horsten/Pettigrew]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / d. Russell's paradox
Russell's Paradox is a stripped-down version of Cantor's Paradox [Priest,G on Russell]
Russell's paradox means we cannot assume that every property is collectivizing [Potter on Russell]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
If 'exist' doesn't express a property, we can hardly ask for its essence [Horsten/Pettigrew]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
Russell refuted Frege's principle that there is a set for each property [Russell, by Sorensen]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / d. Problems with abstracta
How we refer to abstractions is much less clear than how we refer to other things [Rosen]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
A Tarskian model can be seen as a possible state of affairs [Horsten/Pettigrew]
The 'spheres model' was added to possible worlds, to cope with counterfactuals [Horsten/Pettigrew]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
Epistemic logic introduced impossible worlds [Horsten/Pettigrew]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Possible worlds models contain sets of possible worlds; this is a large metaphysical commitment [Horsten/Pettigrew]
Using possible worlds for knowledge and morality may be a step too far [Horsten/Pettigrew]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
We don't assert private thoughts; the objects are part of what we assert [Russell]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
The Way of Abstraction used to say an abstraction is an idea that was formed by abstracting [Rosen]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 5. Abstracta by Negation
Nowadays abstractions are defined as non-spatial, causally inert things [Rosen]
Chess may be abstract, but it has existed in specific space and time [Rosen]
Sets are said to be abstract and non-spatial, but a set of books can be on a shelf [Rosen]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 6. Abstracta by Conflation
Conflating abstractions with either sets or universals is a big claim, needing a big defence [Rosen]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
Functional terms can pick out abstractions by asserting an equivalence relation [Rosen]
Abstraction by equivalence relationships might prove that a train is an abstract entity [Rosen]