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All the ideas for 'Mathematical Methods in Philosophy', 'My Philosophical Development' and 'Getting Causes from Powers'

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78 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
Only by analysing is progress possible in philosophy [Russell]
Analysis gives new knowledge, without destroying what we already have [Russell]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / a. Category mistakes
The theory of types makes 'Socrates and killing are two' illegitimate [Russell]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Truth belongs to beliefs, not to propositions and sentences [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
I gradually replaced classes with properties, and they ended as a symbolic convenience [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 9. Philosophical Logic
Three stages of philosophical logic: syntactic (1905-55), possible worlds (1963-85), widening (1990-) [Horsten/Pettigrew]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Leibniz bases everything on subject/predicate and substance/property propositions [Russell]
Logical formalization makes concepts precise, and also shows their interrelation [Horsten/Pettigrew]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
Names are meaningless unless there is an object which they designate [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
Models are sets with functions and relations, and truth built up from the components [Horsten/Pettigrew]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
We tried to define all of pure maths using logical premisses and concepts [Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
Formalists say maths is merely conventional marks on paper, like the arbitrary rules of chess [Russell]
Formalism can't apply numbers to reality, so it is an evasion [Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
Intuitionism says propositions are only true or false if there is a method of showing it [Russell]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
If 'exist' doesn't express a property, we can hardly ask for its essence [Horsten/Pettigrew]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
A process is unified as an expression of a collection of causal powers [Mumford/Anjum]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
Events are essentially changes; property exemplifications are just states of affairs [Mumford/Anjum]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
In 1899-1900 I adopted the philosophy of logical atomism [Russell]
Complex things can be known, but not simple things [Russell]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
Facts are everything, except simples; they are either relations or qualities [Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
Weak emergence is just unexpected, and strong emergence is beyond all deduction [Mumford/Anjum]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
Powers explain properties, causes, modality, events, and perhaps even particulars [Mumford/Anjum]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Powers offer no more explanation of nature than laws do [Mumford/Anjum]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
Powers are not just basic forces, since they combine to make new powers [Mumford/Anjum]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
Dispositionality is a natural selection function, picking outcomes from the range of possibilities [Mumford/Anjum]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
We say 'power' and 'disposition' are equivalent, but some say dispositions are manifestable [Mumford/Anjum]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
The simple conditional analysis of dispositions doesn't allow for possible prevention [Mumford/Anjum]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
Might dispositions be reduced to normativity, or to intentionality? [Mumford/Anjum]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
Universals can't just be words, because words themselves are universals [Russell]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
If statue and clay fall and crush someone, the event is not overdetermined [Mumford/Anjum]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object
Pandispositionalists say structures are clusters of causal powers [Mumford/Anjum]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
Perdurantism imposes no order on temporal parts, so sequences of events are contingent [Mumford/Anjum]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 1. Types of Modality
Dispositionality is the core modality, with possibility and necessity as its extreme cases [Mumford/Anjum]
Dispositions may suggest modality to us - as what might not have been, and what could have been [Mumford/Anjum]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
Relations are naturally necessary when they are generated by the essential mechanisms of the world [Mumford/Anjum]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Possibility might be non-contradiction, or recombinations of the actual, or truth in possible worlds [Mumford/Anjum]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
Maybe truths are necessitated by the facts which are their truthmakers [Mumford/Anjum]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
A Tarskian model can be seen as a possible state of affairs [Horsten/Pettigrew]
The 'spheres model' was added to possible worlds, to cope with counterfactuals [Horsten/Pettigrew]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
Epistemic logic introduced impossible worlds [Horsten/Pettigrew]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Possible worlds models contain sets of possible worlds; this is a large metaphysical commitment [Horsten/Pettigrew]
Using possible worlds for knowledge and morality may be a step too far [Horsten/Pettigrew]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
In epistemology we should emphasis the continuity between animal and human minds [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
We have more than five senses; balance and proprioception, for example [Mumford/Anjum]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 3. Pragmatism
Pragmatism judges by effects, but I judge truth by causes [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Empiricists seem unclear what they mean by 'experience' [Russell]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem
True belief about the time is not knowledge if I luckily observe a stopped clock at the right moment [Russell]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
Smoking disposes towards cancer; smokers without cancer do not falsify this claim [Mumford/Anjum]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
If causation were necessary, the past would fix the future, and induction would be simple [Mumford/Anjum]
The only full uniformities in nature occur from the essences of fundamental things [Mumford/Anjum]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
Nature is not completely uniform, and some regular causes sometimes fail to produce their effects [Mumford/Anjum]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
It is tempting to think that only entailment provides a full explanation [Mumford/Anjum]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
A structure won't give a causal explanation unless we know the powers of the structure [Mumford/Anjum]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Behaviourists struggle to explain memory and imagination, because they won't admit images [Russell]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
Strong emergence seems to imply top-down causation, originating in consciousness [Mumford/Anjum]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / b. Error
Surprise is a criterion of error [Russell]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
Unverifiable propositions about the remote past are still either true or false [Russell]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
You can believe the meaning of a sentence without thinking of the words [Russell]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Causation by absence is not real causation, but part of our explanatory practices [Mumford/Anjum]
Causation may not be transitive. Does a fire cause itself to be extinguished by the sprinklers? [Mumford/Anjum]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
Causation is the passing around of powers [Mumford/Anjum]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 6. Causation as primitive
We take causation to be primitive, as it is hard to see how it could be further reduced [Mumford/Anjum]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Causation doesn't have two distinct relata; it is a single unfolding process [Mumford/Anjum]
A collision is a process, which involves simultaneous happenings, but not instantaneous ones [Mumford/Anjum]
Does causation need a third tying ingredient, or just two that meet, or might there be a single process? [Mumford/Anjum]
Sugar dissolving is a process taking time, not one event and then another [Mumford/Anjum]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
Privileging one cause is just an epistemic or pragmatic matter, not an ontological one [Mumford/Anjum]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
Coincidence is conjunction without causation; smoking causing cancer is the reverse [Mumford/Anjum]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
Occasionally a cause makes no difference (pre-emption, perhaps) so the counterfactual is false [Mumford/Anjum]
Is a cause because of counterfactual dependence, or is the dependence because there is a cause? [Mumford/Anjum]
Cases of preventing a prevention may give counterfactual dependence without causation [Mumford/Anjum]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
Nature can be interfered with, so a cause never necessitates its effects [Mumford/Anjum]
We assert causes without asserting that they necessitate their effects [Mumford/Anjum]
Necessary causation should survive antecedent strengthening, but no cause can always survive that [Mumford/Anjum]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 7. Strictness of Laws
A 'ceteris paribus' clause implies that a conditional only has dispositional force [Mumford/Anjum]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
There may be necessitation in the world, but causation does not supply it [Mumford/Anjum]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
Laws are nothing more than descriptions of the behaviour of powers [Mumford/Anjum]
If laws are equations, cause and effect must be simultaneous (or the law would be falsified)! [Mumford/Anjum]