18 ideas
| 3745 | Must sentences make statements to qualify for truth? [O'Connor] |
| 3742 | Beliefs must match facts, but also words must match beliefs [O'Connor] |
| 3744 | The semantic theory requires sentences as truth-bearers, not propositions [O'Connor] |
| 3749 | What does 'true in English' mean? [O'Connor] |
| 3746 | Logic seems to work for unasserted sentences [O'Connor] |
| 18739 | Three stages of philosophical logic: syntactic (1905-55), possible worlds (1963-85), widening (1990-) [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
| 18741 | Logical formalization makes concepts precise, and also shows their interrelation [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
| 18744 | Models are sets with functions and relations, and truth built up from the components [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
| 18740 | If 'exist' doesn't express a property, we can hardly ask for its essence [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
| 3747 | Events are fast changes which are of interest to us [O'Connor] |
| 18745 | A Tarskian model can be seen as a possible state of affairs [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
| 18747 | The 'spheres model' was added to possible worlds, to cope with counterfactuals [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
| 18748 | Epistemic logic introduced impossible worlds [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
| 18746 | Possible worlds models contain sets of possible worlds; this is a large metaphysical commitment [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
| 18750 | Using possible worlds for knowledge and morality may be a step too far [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
| 3748 | Without language our beliefs are particular and present [O'Connor] |
| 3743 | We can't contemplate our beliefs until we have expressed them [O'Connor] |
| 16714 | The state should kill blasphemous heretics [Erasmus] |