Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mathematical Methods in Philosophy', 'True to the Facts' and 'Truth and Truthmakers'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

41 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
18390 All metaphysical discussion should be guided by a quest for truthmakers [Armstrong]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
8188 Davidson takes truth to attach to individual sentences [Davidson, by Dummett]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
18467 Truth-making can't be entailment, because truthmakers are portions of reality [Armstrong]
18468 Armstrong says truthmakers necessitate their truth, where 'necessitate' is a primitive relation [Armstrong, by MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
18377 Negative truths have as truthmakers all states of affairs relevant to the truth [Armstrong]
18382 The nature of arctic animals is truthmaker for the absence of penguins there [Armstrong]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 7. Making Modal Truths
18384 One truthmaker will do for a contingent truth and for its contradictory [Armstrong]
18394 In mathematics, truthmakers are possible instantiations of structures [Armstrong]
18387 The truthmakers for possible unicorns are the elements in their combination [Armstrong]
18386 What is the truthmaker for 'it is possible that there could have been nothing'? [Armstrong]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 8. Making General Truths
18381 Necessitating general truthmakers must also specify their limits [Armstrong]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
18396 The set theory brackets { } assert that the member is a unit [Armstrong]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
18393 For 'there is a class with no members' we don't need the null set as truthmaker [Armstrong]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 9. Philosophical Logic
18739 Three stages of philosophical logic: syntactic (1905-55), possible worlds (1963-85), widening (1990-) [Horsten/Pettigrew]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
18741 Logical formalization makes concepts precise, and also shows their interrelation [Horsten/Pettigrew]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
18744 Models are sets with functions and relations, and truth built up from the components [Horsten/Pettigrew]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
18392 Classes have cardinalities, so their members must all be treated as units [Armstrong]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
18740 If 'exist' doesn't express a property, we can hardly ask for its essence [Horsten/Pettigrew]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
18385 Logical atomism builds on the simple properties, but are they the only possible properties? [Armstrong]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 5. Naturalism
18391 'Naturalism' says only the world of space-time exists [Armstrong]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. States of Affairs
18374 Truthmaking needs states of affairs, to unite particulars with tropes or universals. [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
18372 We need properties, as minimal truthmakers for the truths about objects [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
18379 The determinates of a determinable must be incompatible with each other [Armstrong]
18378 Length is a 'determinable' property, and one mile is one its 'determinates' [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
18373 If tropes are non-transferable, then they necessarily belong to their particular substance [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
18400 Properties are not powers - they just have powers [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
18397 Powers must result in some non-powers, or there would only be potential without result [Armstrong]
18399 How does the power of gravity know the distance it acts over? [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
18371 The class of similar things is much too big a truthmaker for the feature of a particular [Armstrong]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
18389 When entities contain entities, or overlap with them, there is 'partial' identity [Armstrong]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
18745 A Tarskian model can be seen as a possible state of affairs [Horsten/Pettigrew]
18747 The 'spheres model' was added to possible worlds, to cope with counterfactuals [Horsten/Pettigrew]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
18748 Epistemic logic introduced impossible worlds [Horsten/Pettigrew]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
18388 Possible worlds don't fix necessities; intrinsic necessities imply the extension in worlds [Armstrong]
18746 Possible worlds models contain sets of possible worlds; this is a large metaphysical commitment [Horsten/Pettigrew]
18750 Using possible worlds for knowledge and morality may be a step too far [Horsten/Pettigrew]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
18375 General truths are a type of negative truth, saying there are no more ravens than black ones [Armstrong]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
18368 For all being, there is a potential proposition which expresses its existence and nature [Armstrong]
18370 A realm of abstract propositions is causally inert, so has no explanatory value [Armstrong]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
18380 Negative causations supervene on positive causations plus their laws? [Armstrong]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / e. Present moment
18401 The pure present moment is too brief to be experienced [Armstrong]