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All the ideas for 'Mathematical Methods in Philosophy', 'Experience First (and reply)' and 'Definitions'

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24 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
11223 Definitions usually have a term, a 'definiendum' containing the term, and a defining 'definiens' [Gupta]
11215 Notable definitions have been of piety (Plato), God (Anselm), number (Frege), and truth (Tarski) [Gupta]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
11225 A definition needs to apply to the same object across possible worlds [Gupta]
11227 The 'revision theory' says that definitions are rules for improving output [Gupta]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 3. Types of Definition
11224 Traditional definitions are general identities, which are sentential and reductive [Gupta]
11226 Traditional definitions need: same category, mention of the term, and conservativeness and eliminability [Gupta]
11221 A definition can be 'extensionally', 'intensionally' or 'sense' adequate [Gupta]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
11217 Chemists aim at real definition of things; lexicographers aim at nominal definition of usage [Gupta]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
11216 If definitions aim at different ideals, then defining essence is not a unitary activity [Gupta]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 10. Stipulative Definition
11218 Stipulative definition assigns meaning to a term, ignoring prior meanings [Gupta]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 11. Ostensive Definition
11220 Ostensive definitions look simple, but are complex and barely explicable [Gupta]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 6. Ordering in Sets
11222 The ordered pair <x,y> is defined as the set {{x},{x,y}}, capturing function, not meaning [Gupta]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 9. Philosophical Logic
18739 Three stages of philosophical logic: syntactic (1905-55), possible worlds (1963-85), widening (1990-) [Horsten/Pettigrew]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
18741 Logical formalization makes concepts precise, and also shows their interrelation [Horsten/Pettigrew]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
18744 Models are sets with functions and relations, and truth built up from the components [Horsten/Pettigrew]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
18740 If 'exist' doesn't express a property, we can hardly ask for its essence [Horsten/Pettigrew]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
18745 A Tarskian model can be seen as a possible state of affairs [Horsten/Pettigrew]
18747 The 'spheres model' was added to possible worlds, to cope with counterfactuals [Horsten/Pettigrew]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
18748 Epistemic logic introduced impossible worlds [Horsten/Pettigrew]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
18746 Possible worlds models contain sets of possible worlds; this is a large metaphysical commitment [Horsten/Pettigrew]
18750 Using possible worlds for knowledge and morality may be a step too far [Horsten/Pettigrew]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
19542 It is nonsense that understanding does not involve knowledge; to understand, you must know [Dougherty/Rysiew]
19543 To grasp understanding, we should be more explicit about what needs to be known [Dougherty/Rysiew]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 7. Knowledge First
19541 Rather than knowledge, our epistemic aim may be mere true belief, or else understanding and wisdom [Dougherty/Rysiew]